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The Executive Privilege Doctrine in
Pennsylvania: A Story of Governmental
Powers In Conflict
I. Introduction
The story of executive privilege is one of governmental powers
in conflict. From the viewpoint of the executive branch, secrecy and
confidentiality are viewed as essential prerequisites to effective and
efficient government. The law has recognized this need and has
clothed the executive branch with what may be broadly termed an
executive privilege - the ability to withhold certain classes of infor-
mation on the grounds that disclosure would be detrimental to the
public interest.'
The need for secrecy, however, often directly conflicts with the
interests of others who must have access to the information for vari-
ous reasons.2 The tension produced by these competing interests is
I. The privilege discussed here is an evidentiary one, as opposed to one related to the
tortious nonliability of the executive official. The tort law principle that immunizes public offi-
cials from liability for discretionary acts may, in fact, result in the suppression of evidence but
this would not be because of any testimonial privilege of the officer. For the distinction in
Pennsylvania between suits that fall within substantive tort immunity and those that do not see
Philadelphia Life Insurance Company v. Commonwealth, 410 Pa. 570, 576-77, 190 A.2d 111,
114 (1963). See also I Pa. C.S.A. § 2310 (1985); 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8521 (1982).
For further discussion of substantive tort immunity see Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 571
(1959); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 132 (4th ed. 1971); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2368, at 746-47 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
2. Most broadly defined, the executive privilege concept encompasses attempts by the
executive branch to withhold information from the legislature, the public and the courts. This
comment will focus on the claim as asserted vis-a-vis the courts.
Regarding the claim vis-a-vis the public, the citizen's right to examine and inspect "public
records" is governed exclusively by the "Right to Know" Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1-.4
(Purdon 1983). The scope of the Act is limited by the definition of "Agency" and "Public
Record." The Act's definition of "Agency" as "any department, board, or commission of the
executive branch" has been held to include the Governor himself. Shapp v. Butera, 22 Pa.
Commw. 229, 348 A.2d 910 (1975). The term "public record" has been held not to include
state department budget records required by the budget secretary. Butera v. Commonwealth
Office of Budget, 29 Pa. Commw. 343, 370 A.2d 1248 (1974). See also Shapp, 22 Pa.
Commw. at 229, 348 A.2d at 910 (disclosure statements voluntarily submitted in response to
an executive order not within definition of "public record").
The fact that access to a document cannot be gained under the Right to Know Law does
not mean, however, that the information is barred from discovery or use in court proceedings.
The purpose of the Right to Know Law is to make more information available to the public
and to curb the discretion of public officers in disclosing such information to the public at
large. As such, that law has little connection with the duty traditionally recognized by public
officials to make relevant public information available to litigants in judicial proceedings. "The
most visible when information in the custody of the executive branch
is necessary to adjudicate the claims of parties who have come to
court to reconcile their differences.' In this situation, the tension
heightens. If the court determines that the information should be
produced to determine the issues justly, and if the executive branch
refuses to disclose such information, the result is a head-to-head con-
frontation between two coequal branches of government.'
State and federal courts5 have long grappled with the conflicts
question of whether information should be protected in court proceedings involves entirely dif-
ferent policy considerations that the legislature did not consider in enacting this right to know
legislation." Azen v. Lampenfield, 18 Pa. D. & C.3d 574, 576 (Allegheny C.P. 1981).
Accordingly, a Governor probably could not ground a privilege solely on the fact that a
particular document does not constitute "a public record." By the same token, if the subject
matter sought does constitute a "public record" under the Act, the Governor or an executive
official could not make a successful claim of privilege. This position is supported by the federal
courts' construction of the Freedom of Information Act, an analogue to Pennsylvania Right to
Know Law, 5 U.S.C. § 522 (1983). Although it excepts certain matters from its disclosure
provisions, the Freedom of Information Act does not purport to make them privileged in the
evidentiary sense. See Pleasant Hill Bank v. United States, 58 F.R.D. 97 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
3. In addition to arising in a judicial context, the executive privilege may also be
invoked when the legislature subpoenas the Governor's office for information.
One commentator has suggested that the legislative demand for executive papers is
"closely related and logically indistinguishable" from the demand on the executive by a judi-
cial subpoena, i.e., both test the constitutional separation of powers basis of executive privilege.
See Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 60
YALE L.J. 477, 484-85 (1957).
Another commentator draws a distinction between the "evidentiary rule of executive priv-
ilege," which involves the right of the executive to withhold otherwise relevant evidence when
some potential injury to the public is deemed to outweigh the requirements of a fair trial, and
the "political doctrine of executive secrecy," which involves the power of the executive to with-
hold information from the legislative branch. See Younger, Congressional Investigations and
Executive Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 755 n.1 (1955).
See also Executive Privilege: Myths and Realities, Sw. U. L. REV. 931, 932-33 (1976) (differ-
ent interests come into play depending upon whether privilege is asserted against Congress or
the courts).
To examine federal law on the executive privilege vis-a-vis Congress, see Berger, Execu-
tive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1044 (1965); Collins, The Power of
Congressional Committees of Investigation to Obtain Information from The Executive
Branch: The Argument for the Legislative Branch, 39 GEo. L.J. 563 (1957); Rogers, Constitu-
tional Law: The Papers of the Executive Branch, 44 A.B.A.J. 941 (1958); Wolkinson, De-
mands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, 10 FE. B.J. 103 (1949); Legislative
Note, Policing the Executive Branch, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 568 (1972); Note, Power of Presi-
dent to Refuse Congressional Demands for Information, I STAN. L. REv. 256 (1949).
For the Pennsylvania law on the executive privilege vis-a-vis the legislative branch see
Lewis v. Thornburgh, 68 Pa. Commw. 157, 448 A.2d 680 (1982); Lewis v. Thornburgh, 75 Pa.
Commw. 207, 462 A.2d 310 (1983); In re Investigation Dauphin County Grand Jury, Septem-
ber 1938. 332 Pa. 342, 2 A.2d 802 (1938); see also Opinion of the Attorney General, 15 Pa.
D. & C. 273 (1931) (Attorney General's advice that Governor should not appear before legis-
lative committee).
4. The executive privilege can be asserted at almost any stage of the litigation. Vari-
ous factors intervene at each stage. At the enforcement stage, separation of powers concerns
become most evident. See infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
Regarding the discovery stage and the testimony at trial, similar considerations come into
play. In both state and federal courts, matters deemed to be privileged at trial must also be
excluded from disclosure during discovery. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6
(1953); Putnik Travel Agency v. Goldberg, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 590, 592 (Philadelphia C.P.
1958).
5. Courts and commentators have recognized that there is little substantive difference
produced by an assertion of executive privilege. Pennsylvania case
law reconciles the conflicts by affording the Governor, as well as cer-
tain subordinates, an unqualified executive privilege, which provides
the chief executive with absolute discretion to define the scope and
applicability of the privilege. Under the Pennsylvania approach, the
Governor's view is conclusive and unreviewable by the courts."
The law in Pennsylvania directly conflicts with United States
Supreme Court decisions holding that "judicial control over the evi-
dence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive of-
ficers"7 and that neither the separation of powers doctrine nor the
need for confidentiality can "sustain an absolute, unqualified privi-
lege from judicial process under all circumstances." 8 Rather than re-
lying on an absolute executive privilege to reconcile the competing
interests, the overwhelming majority of courts have engaged in a bal-
ancing process. The courts weigh the executive's interest in secrecy
against the litigant's need for evidence in a particular case.9
This comment will initially present a brief historical background
as well as an overview of the rationales that have supported the con-
cept of executive privilege. Next, the federal case law will be ex-
amined and juxtaposed against relevant decisional law in Pennsylva-
nia. This line of Pennsylvania cases will be assessed from a
constitutional and policy standpoint. The contours of the privilege
will then be examined in terms of who in the executive branch is
entitled to assert the privilege. Finally, the comment will conclude by
suggesting what direction future case law should take.
between the executive privilege as asserted by the Governor of a state and as asserted by the
President of the United States. See Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 368 A.2d 846 (1978) (Gov-
ernor capable of claiming executive privilege from disclosing confidential communications as
can the President); Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980) (Governor enti-
tled to same privilege as the President because he bears the same relation to his state as does
the President to the country). Evidentiary handbooks for purposes of discussing executive priv-
ilege have also grouped Presidents and Governors together. See, e.g., GREENLEAF, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 251, at 388-89 (16th ed. 1899). But see Comment, Executive
Privilege at the State Level, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 631 (1974) (executive privilege at the state level
requires separate treatment because of structural differences between the two levels of govern-
ment) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Executive Privilege at the State Level]. See generally
Construction and Application under State Law of Doctrine of Executive Privilege 10 ALR 4th
355 (1981).
6. See infra notes 49-89 and accompanying text.
7. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10.
8. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
9. The trade-offs involved in this balancing process were astutely illustrated by one
federal court that said the
foundation of executive privilege is the unfortunately necessary policy of fetter-
ing justice to promote national health. It is, in effect, a choice between two evils:
on the one hand, we have half informed litigants, who sometimes get justice, if
at all, by accident; on the other hand, we have disruptive publicity of documents,
plans and policies which by their very nature must be kept secret to be effective.
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
II. History and Rationale of the Executive Privilege
The roots of the executive privilege trace back to the English
doctrine stating that the King is immune from judicial process. The
King's immunity extended both to the requirement of appearing as a
witness at trial and of divulging information requested by litigants.' 0
This royal prerogative did not rest well with the American colonists,
who resisted the abuses of concentrated executive power."
Members of the Constitutional Convention, in the few remarks
they made on the topic, seemed to disapprove the concept of presi-
dential privilege. For example, James Wilson, one of the primary
architects and defenders of the Constitution, told the Pennsylvania
Ratification Convention:
The executive power is better to be trusted when it has no
screen. Sir, we have a responsibility in the person of our Presi-
dent; he cannot act improperly, and hide either his negligence or
inattention; he cannot roll upon any other person the weight of
his criminality . . . . Add to all this, that officer is placed high
and is possessed of power far from being contemptible, yet not a
single privilege is annexed to his character . .. .
The framers of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution so feared
and disfavored a domineering chief executive that they created a
twelve member executive council instead."
Although the framers may have originally envisioned a rela-
tively weak executive branch,' the experience of the growing nation
10. See Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L.
REV. 166, 170 n.19 (1958).
II. The distinction between the American and British systems is illustrated in an early
work on the United States Constitution:
[Tlhe principle which thus shields and protects the monarch; the sovereignty
resident in himself, creates the distinction between him and the elected, though
supreme, magistrate of a republic, where the sovereignty resides in the people.
All its officers, whether high or low, are but agents, to whom a temporary power
is imparted, and on whom no immunity is conferred. An exemption from the
power of the law, even in a small particular, except upon special occasions,
would break in upon this important principle, and the freedom of the people, the
great and sacred object of republican government would be put in jeopardy.
RAWLES, ON THE CONSTITUTION 169 (Philadelphia 1829) (emphasis added).
The exception alluded to by Rawles was the immunity granted to legislators traveling to
and from and attending legislative sessions. Rawles further declared that "no other officer of
government is entitled to the same immunity in the same respect." Id. at 170.
See also United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D.Va. 1807) No. 14,692 (Chief
Justice Marshall focusing on the public accountability and impeachability of the President as
distinguished from the King who inherits his title and can never be a subject).
12. BRANNING, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 14 (1966).
13. J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 480 (2d ed. 1836). For another expression of the view that
the framers were compelled by their experiences in England to disfavor a presidential privilege,
see the remarks of Charles Pickney before the Senate on March 5, 1800. M. FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 384-85 (1967).
14. Certain difficulties arise in attempting to construe the intent of the Framers. The
revealed that a certain amount of discretion had to be allocated to a
chief executive so that he could respond effectively to domestic and
foreign policy situations.15 Political realities dictated that the execu-
tive branch of the government could not be operated in a "fish
bowl."'16 Courts and commentators recognized that some degree of
secrecy was necessary and that there had to be some assurance
against unwarranted disclosure of confidential information to either
the courts or the legislature.
17
Due to these political realities an evidentiary privilege for intra-
and inter-governmental documents and opinions emerged from the
common law. This privilege has been referred to as an official infor-
mation privilege.18 The purpose of the privilege is to assure open and
frank discussions between executive officials concerning administra-
tive action. Without the privilege, officials could well temper their
remarks, to the detriment of the decision making process, since they
members of the Constitutional Convention were people of varied opinions. Often there was not
a unitary thought on a particular issue; thus one can draw conflicting inferences from the
debate records. Archibald Cox has stated that "if one selects with care an authoritative gener-
alization about the separation of powers, he can extrapolate any desired conclusion concerning
executive privilege." Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1391 (1974). Not-
withstanding this caveat, Cox does conclude that "the best opinion at Anglo-American Law
has always been that no man is wholly free from the testimonial duty to give evidence required
in the administration of justice." Id. at 1385.
Because of the difficulties of interpretation that arise from relying on historical records,
individual framers appear to have expressed inconsistent ideas under varying circumstances.
For example, James Wilson, in contradistinction to the quotation noted above, has been re-
ferred to as an early advocate for a strong executive. On at least one occasion the works of
Wilson have been cited in support of an absolute executive privilege and in support of the
proposition that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits any form of intrusion by one
branch into the decisional process of another. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 750-51 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing 2 WILSONS WORKS 409-10).
Further, the Pennsylvania courts have held that the remarks of individual constitutional
delegates should not be considered in construing the constitution. See Commonwealth v.
Balph, I I I Pa. 365, 380, 3 A. 220, 229 (1886); Commonwealth ex rel. Carson v. Mathues, 210
Pa. 372, 392, 59 A. 961, 969 (1904). But see Determination of Priority of Commission among
Certain Judges of the Superior Court and Commonwealth Court, 493 Pa. 555, 427 A.2d 153
(1981). See generally, Woodside, Pennsylvania Constitutional Law, 63-67 (1985).
15. As early as 1829, a prominent writer on the Constitution remarked: "If all the
transactions of a cabinet, whether in respect to internal or external business, were regularly
exhibited to the public eye, its own operations would be impeded; the public mind be perplexed
and improper advantages would sometimes be taken." RAWLES, supra note 11, at 172.
16. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 764 (Wilkey, J., dissenting); see also Liquor
Law Violation Informers, 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 742 (1958) (deep-rooted common law rule that
communications relating to affairs of state are generally privileged).
17. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl.
1958) is cited frequently as the first decision to recognize a qualified privilege for intergovern-
mental communications. In Kaiser, a government contractor sued the United States alleging
that the government had breached its promise not to contract with others on more favorable
terms. The plaintiff sought to discover documents relating to the government's reasons for
offering certain terms during negotiations with another prospective contractor. The court up-
held the government's claim of privilege from inspection because it believed disclosure would
damage the public interest. See also United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973)
(recognizing well-established rule that executive branch is privileged not to disclose documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations).
18. See UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 34.
know their opinions may be publicly disseminated. Officials may be
less than forthright because of their fear of civil liability for slander
and libel should their remarks enter the public record. 19 Confidenti-
ality and secrecy are seen as being necessary for candor, and candor
is viewed as an essential prerequisite to effective executive decision
making.
The rationale for the common law official information privilege
was best stated by one federal court when it recognized that
"[flreedom of communication vital to the aims of wholesome rela-
tionships is obtained only by removing the spectre of compelled dis-
closure . . . .Government needs open but protected channels for the
kind of plain talk that is essential to the quality of its functioning." ' 0
Related to the official information privilege is the informant's
privilege, which is also grounded in common law.21 Both the official
information and informant's privilege are concerned with protecting
the sources and flow of information essential to executive govern-
mental functions. The informant's privilege is specifically concerned
with the interest of law enforcement officers in nondisclosure of the
identities of those reporting criminal violations. The privilege is
based on the premise that an assurance of anonymity is often neces-
sary to encourage citizens to furnish information to appropriate offi-
cials about violations of the law. By promising confidentiality, the
citizen is encouraged to cooperate with the police and the resulting
increased flow of information furthers the public interest in law
enforcement.22
In addition to the common law,23 the executive privilege can
19. E.g., Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705.
20. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. Cir. 1966),
aff'd sub nom., V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jean, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
21. See, e.g., In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1894) (information given by a
private citizen concerning commission of offense is a privileged and confidential communica-
tion the disclosure of which cannot be compelled by the government); UNIFORM RULE OF Evi-
DENCE 36.
22. See generally Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (purpose of privilege is
furtherance and protection of public interest in effective law enforcement); United States v.
Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949) (identity of informer held privileged on basis of
public policy).
23. The privilege of an executive official to protect certain information from public
disclosure may also be statutorily based. Several states have codified the privilege in some
form. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040 (West 1966), construed in In re Lynna B., 92 Cal.
App. 3d 682, 155 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.040, construed in City of Port-
land v. Nudelman, 45 Or. App. 425, 608 P.2d 1190 (1980). For other state statutes designed
to insulate the executive from inquiry see WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2378(a) at 799-800 n.9.
Although Pennsylvania has no statute that protects the papers of the Governor per se,
state statutes and regulations have been enacted restricting disclosure of confidential communi-
cations of certain classes of information that are in the possession of the executive branch.
Included among these communications is certain information furnished the Attorney General,
73 PA. STAT ANN. § 201-6; records of the Department of Health, 62 PA. STAT. ANN. §
403.404, construed in Argo v. Goodstein, 438 Pa. 468, 265 A.2d 783 (1973); information from
also be grounded upon the constitutional separation of powers princi-
ple.24 Under this rationale, the independence of the executive within
its own sphere insulates a Governor from judicial subpoenas and
other forms of compulsory process.25 By virtue of the constitutional
power vested in the Chief Executive to execute the laws faithfully,26
the Governor or President is deemed to have final discretion, as
against other branches of government, over matters in his depart-
ment. The separation of powers doctrine states that each governmen-
tal branch is coequal in every respect. If the judiciary were to com-
pel the executive to disclose certain information, it would contravene
the tripartite design of government because it would be attempting
to assert authority over one branch in a relationship marked by
equanimity.
7
As indicated above, both state and federal courts have been
willing to recognize the important public policies supporting the con-
tax returns, 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 731; and records of the Department of Public Welfare, 62
PA. STAT. ANN. § 505, 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 404. The Welfare Disclosure Act, 62 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 404(a)(1) does, however, permit access to the addresses and amounts of money re-
ceived by welfare recipients. See McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 300 A.2d 888
(1973) (an adult resident is not entitled to the names of recipients under the Act, but must
supply the names of the recipients before disclosure of addresses and amounts).
For attempts to codify the privilege at the federal level see Erwin, Controlling "Executive
Privilege", 20 LOYOLA L. REV. 1 (1974) (proposes S.2432 that would establish a procedure to
govern the claim of privilege by the executive branch as it is asserted against congressional
inquiries). See also PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 509, Secrets of State and Other Official Informa-
tion (recognizing official information privilege whose policy basis is to encourage candor in
exchange of views within the government). For an analysis of why Rule 509 could not muster
enough congressional support see Berger, How the Privilege for Governmental Information
Met Its Watergate, 25 CASE W. RES. 747 (1975).
24. Whether the privilege is based on the common law or on the Constitution is an
important question for at least two reasons. First, a common law privilege is amenable to
legislative modification but a constitutional privilege is not. See Comment, Executive Privilege:
What Are the Limits?, 54 OR. L. REv. 81, 83 (1975). Second, the privilege, if based on the
common law, is an evidentiary one and can therefore be raised only in a judicial context. A
constitutionally based privilege, on the other hand, may be asserted in numerous settings and
has been used to withhold information from both the public and the legislature as well as the
courts. See Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 731 MIcH. L. REV.
971, 1015 (1975). The boundaries of the two privileges overlap one another, but the scope of
the constitutionally grounded privilege may be more imprecise because it has been defined
mostly by executive use rather than through judicial theory. Id. at 1017.
25. See Brief for Respondent at 49, 74, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683.
26. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § I; PA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
27. Associated with the executive privilege is the state secrets privilege, which is
grounded partly on the constitutionally delegated power of the executive to act as commander-
in-chief. The policy behind this privilege is obviously the protection of national security. As
such, this privilege is viewed as applying only to the federal government. Comment, Executive
Privilege at the State Level, supra note 5, at 645 (citing Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege,
50 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1966)). There are situations, however, in which this privilege may be
properly asserted by a state officer. See, e.g., Hartranft's Appeal, 85 Pa. 433 (1877) (state
militia used to suppress rioting strikers). For example, art. I, § 10, cl. 3 of the United States
Constitution implicitly empowers states to compact with other states or foreign states and to
declare war if actually invaded. Furthermore, art. I, § 8, cl. 10 of the Constitution reserves to
the states the authority to maintain and deploy their National Guard units. Materials prepared
by executive officials in connection with the exercise of these powers would presumably be
protected under the state secrets privilege. 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 385, 391 n.60 (1981).
cept of executive privilege. These policies, although meritorious and
worthy of protection, often clash with the litigant's need for relevant
evidence resting in the hands of the executive branch. This comment
will turn to an examination of how the federal and Pennsylvania
courts have reconciled the tension produced by an executive claim of
privilege. Next, the merits and demerits of the Pennsylvania view,
which establishes an absolute privilege, will be assessed in light of
federal case law.
III. Reconciling Executive Secrecy with the Need of the Litigant
to Obtain Relevant Evidence
A. The View of the Federal Courts
The federal courts have resolved the tensions between executive
secrecy and a litigant's need for evidence by holding that the court,
not the Chief Executive, will determine the scope and applicability
of the privilege when an executive official claims that certain infor-
mation is exempt from judicial examination. Although the early
cases are somewhat ambiguous and the Supreme Court rulings are
few, a discernable position has emerged out of federal case law.
When confronted with an executive privilege claim in connection
with a demand for evidence relevant in a judicial proceeding, the
federal courts have weighed the government's interest in preserving
the confidentiality of the requested information against the litigant's
need for the evidence. If the litigant's interest prevails, production of
the requested information will be ordered.
1. United States v. Burr.28-In the earliest American case on
executive privilege, United States v. Burr, Justice John Marshall is-
sued two subpoenas to President Jefferson. The first subpoena or-
dered him to appear as a witness during the treason trial of Aaron
Burr. The second demanded certain correspondence requested by
Burr. The correspondence, which was between Jefferson and General
Wilkinson, allegedly contained incriminating information. Although
Jefferson ignored the subpoena to appear and denied the authority of
the court to issue it, he partially complied with the order to produce
the letters by submitting excerpted versions to the court.2 9
Burr has been subjected to different interpretations."0 On one
28. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d); 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(No. 14,694).
29. 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
30. See O'Brien, The Dissenting Opinions of Nixon v. Sirica: An Argument for Execu-
tive Privilege in the White House Tapes Controversy, 28 Sw. L.J. 373, 383 (1974) ("Much of
what was said in both Burr trials is still shrouded in fog which is not entirely dissipated even
by today's many distinguished commentators").
hand, the case has been interpreted to illustrate that the Chief Exec-
utive must yield to judicial control over the evidence in a case.3 Pro-
ponents of this interpretation point to Jefferson's willingness to sup-
ply the court with materials it might find relevant.32 But Burr has
also been read to indicate a lack of judicial power over the executive
branch.3 3 This reading finds support in the circumstances of the Burr
case because Jefferson ultimately did determine the scope of the
privilege by ordering his attorney to delete all irrelevant portions of
the requested correspondence before delivery to the court.3 4 Essen-
tially, the Burr decision does not indicate whether the court or the
President should decide which evidence is to be withheld from liti-
gants, since no action was taken against the President after he failed
to comply fully with the court's orders.35
2. United States v. Reynolds..3-The privilege enunciated in
Burr to protect state secrets was later extended to military secrets in
United States v. Reynolds. In Reynolds, a civilian was killed in the
crash of an Air Force plane testing secret electronic equipment. His
widow sought the release of copies of Air Force investigative re-
ports. 37 The Supreme Court held that the materials were privileged
stating that it was the responsibility of the judiciary to determine the
validity of the Executive's claim of privilege. 38 Offering guidelines
for the treatment of privilege claims, the Court said that the showing
of necessity for the requested documents made by the litigant will
determine how far the court should probe into the contents of the
requested information. In each case the court should ascertain if the
occasion is appropriate for recognizing the privilege. When the show-
ing of necessity is strong, the Court stated, the claim of privilege
should not be lightly .accepted by the courts.39
From the time of the Burr case until the Supreme Court ren-
dered its decision in Reynolds, two opposing schools of thought
emerged on the executive privilege concept. One line of thought held
that the Chief Executive's decision to withhold information from a
litigant is absolute and binding on the courts. The other position was
that the executive's determination is always subject to judicial re-
31. See, e.g., R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH, 187-94
(1974).
32. See, e.g., Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4, 6
(1974).
33. See, e.g., Sirica, 487 F.2d at 781-88 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
34. 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 385, 388 (1981).
35. See, e.g., Sirica, 487 F.2d at 787-88 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
36. 345 U.S. I (1953).
37. Id. at 2-5.
38. Id. at 7, 9-10.
39. Id. at 11.
view. The federal courts, in the wake of Reynolds, have forged a
compromise view: they have held that a qualified privilege attaches
to a President's claim that disclosure of certain information will be
detrimental to the public interest. This qualified privilege, however,
*can be overcome should the party seeking access show a substantial
need for the information.40 In rejecting the concept of an absolute
executive privilege, the federal courts have steadfastly maintained
that, in the final analysis, it is the judiciary that determines the pa-
rameters of executive privilege.
41
3. United States v. Nixon."2-In United States v. Nixon the
Supreme Court affirmed a district court's refusal to quash a third-
party subpoena duces tecum issued to President Nixon. The sub-
poena had ordered the President to produce tape recordings and doc-
uments relevant to a grand jury investigation of the Watergate
cover-up. In response to the subpoena, the President asserted an ab-
solute privilege and claimed that the subpoena should be quashed
since it demanded confidential conversations between the President
and his advisers. The President argued it would be inconsistent with
the public interest to produce records of the subpoenaed
conversations."3
The Court first held that the President's claim of privilege was
amenable to judicial review. Relying on language in Marbury v.
Madison, the Supreme Court said it was the province and duty of
the Supreme Court to "say what the law is" regarding executive
privilege." Further, the Court noted that the constitutional balance
of a "workable government" would be upset if the courts were held
powerless to review claims of an evidentiary privilege asserted by an-
other branch of the government.' 5
The Court next rejected the President's claim of absolute execu-
tive privilege for all presidential communications. Instead the Court
found a presumptive privilege for these communications. This pre-
40. Cf. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (presumption of privilege not rebutted when subpoenaed materials were
not critical to committee's performance of its legislative functions) with Sirica, 487 F.2d at
717 (presumption of privilege premised on public interest in confidentiality of presidential con-
versations fails in face of prosecutor's strong showing that subpoenaed items contain items
necessary for grand jury's function).
41. See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 793, 794
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (no executive official can be given absolute authority to determine what docu-
ments in his possession may be considered by the court); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 713
(courts have repeatedly asserted that the applicability of the executive privilege is ultimately
for them and not the executive to decide).
42. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
43. Brief for Respondent at 48a, Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683.
44. 418 U.S. at 705 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
45. Id. at 707.
sumptive privilege, the Court recognized, rested partly on separation
of powers principles and partly on the legitimate need for confidenti-
ality between high government officials."'
The Supreme Court concluded that the presumptive privilege
had been rebutted because the President's generalized interest in
confidentiality could not prevail over the demonstrated need for evi-
dence in a pending criminal trial. 7 The Court observed that a full
disclosure of the facts within the framework of the rules of evidence
was necessary to ensure that justice was done. In order to accomplish
this full disclosure of relevant facts, it was imperative that compul-
sory process be available to courts for the production of evidence
needed by the parties. 8
B. The View of the Pennsylvania Courts
1. Gray v. Pentland.-The earliest Pennsylvania case on exec-
utive privilege is Gray v. Pentland,4 decided in 1815. In that case,
Pentland, a prothonotary, brought a libel action against Gray. Gray
had allegedly submitted a deposition to the Governor charging that
Pentland was incompetent to perform his duties as a prothonotary.5 °
In order to examine the allegedly libelous document, the trial court
served a subpoena duces tecum upon the Governor and the Secretary
of the Commonwealth. These officials refused to produce the deposi-
tion. 51 On appeal,52 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that it
was ithin the Governor's discretion to produce or refuse to produce
the document.5"
Justice Brackenridge thought that to force the production of the
writing
would be a check on representations to the competent authority:
it would restrain the free communications that might be neces-
sary for the public good . . . to lay it down, that a Governor, or
the competent authority, . . should be compellable to produce
46. Id. at 708.
47. Id. at 713.
48. Id. at 709.
49. 2 Serg. & Rawle 23 (Pa. 1815).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. In addition to issuing the subpoena duces tecum, the trial court also entered a rule
for the purpose of taking the Secretary and Governor's depositions. After they refused to com-
ply with that rule or to answer the subpoena, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a
special subpoena duces tecum. On intermediate superior court review, the lower court's action
in refusing to order compulsory process against the officials was apparently not questioned. See
Gray, 2 Serg. & Rawle at 23-24.
53. Gray, 2 Serg. & Rawle at 27. A subsequent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision
reads Gray as standing for the proposition that the production of documents "is quite beyond
the power of the court and the judgment of the executive is regarded as absolute and final."
Hartranft's Appeal, 85 Pa. 433, 448 (1877).
papers for the purpose of supporting an action in law.54
The Justice then suggested that the matter be the subject for legisla-
tion. In the absence of any type of statute, however, the question was
solely one of executive discretion.55
Chief Justice Tilgham voiced similar sentiments. He was very
sensitive to the judicial propriety of ordering the Governor to pro-
duce a document he received in confidence. The Chief Justice feared
the deterrent effect that judicial disclosure might have on those re-
porting useful information to the Governor. Because the Governor
was most familiar with the surrounding circumstances of the case,
the Chief Justice held that the Governor "should exercise his own
judgment with respect to the propriety of producing the writing."'51
By concerning itself with the flow of information to the govern-
ment, the Gray court employed a rationale similar to that underlying
the informant's privilege.5 7 The Gray court's reasoning is also analo-
gous to the public policy behind the official information privilege.
Justice Brackenridge's concern about restraint of the "free commu-
nications that might be necessary for the public good" neatly paral-
lels the rationale underlying a privilege for intra- and inter-govern-
mental information.
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2. Hartranft's Appeal.-Some sixty years after Gray, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court again faced the question of executive
privilege in the seminal case of Hartranft's Appeal.59 In Hartranft, a
grand jury had subpoenaed the Governor, the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth, the Adjutant General and two officers of the National
Guard to testify about the circumstances surrounding the use of the
Guard to suppress a riot between striking railroad workers. 0 When
the Governor refused to respond, the trial court ordered attachment
against him.
Despite a strong dissent, the Supreme Court on appeal dis-
missed the order and excused the Governor and the others from their
duty to appear. The majority then established two broad proposi-
54. Gray, 2 Serg. & Rawle at 27.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 37.
57. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. Wigmore is critical of Gray to the
extent that Gray can be viewed as relying on a governmental informant's privilege. Wigmore
notes that the Gray court failed to realize that the informant's privilege protected only the
identity of the informer and not the substance of his communications. He notes that the privi-
lege was inapplicable to Gray because both the name of the informant and general contents of
the communication had already been disclosed through the filing of the deposition. 8 WIG-
MORE § 2374, supra note 1, at 765 n.3.
58. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
59. 85 Pa. 433 (1877).
60. More than twenty people were killed and over two million dollars worth of property
was destroyed as a result of the riots. Hartranft, 85 Pa. at 451 (Agnew, J., dissenting).
tions. First, the Governor is the final judge of what official communi-
cations directed to himself or to his department are to be revealed. 61
Second, the Governor is exempt from the process of the courts when-
ever engaged in any official duties.
62
Basically, these two broad propositions were grounded upon four
interrelated lines of reasoning. First, the court assumed that a judi-
cial inspection, necessary to determine if the information was privi-
leged, must always be in public. A judicial determination of the ap-
plicability of the privilege was therefore rejected by the majority
because such a determination would effectuate the very
harm-public disclosure-that was intended to be prevented. 8
A second reason for the court's decision in Hartranft rested
upon judicial reluctance to interfere with the performance of the ex-
ecutive's official duties. Because it feared disrupting the functioning
of the executive office, the majority declared that the Governor was
exempt from judicial process whenever engaged in any duty pertain-
ing to his office."" Significantly, the court further held that it was the
Governor himself who was to judge what his official duties were and
when they were to be exercised.65
A third reason for the court's rejection of a judicial determina-
tion of the applicability of the privilege rested upon an underlying
fear of executive disobedience66 should the court issue an order
against the Governor. The Hartranft court was keenly aware of its
lack of physical power to enforce its judgments should the Governor
decide not to comply. 67 Aware of the limits of its power, the court
was extremely careful to avoid a direct conflict with the executive
branch." For the majority, judicial orders were not an effective re-
sponse to a recalcitrant government witness.6 9 Rather, the sole reme-
dies available against a Governor who willfully disobeyed a court
order were those specifically provided in the Constitution - im-
peachment and the electoral process.
70
61. Id. at 445-47.
62. Id. at 450.
63. Id. at 447.
64. Id. at 449.
65. Id. at 449-50.
66. For other state court opinions expressing this fear of executive disobedience, espe-
cially in cases when the Governor is arrested, see Garvey, The Amenability of the Governor to
Court Processes, 7 How. L.J. 120, 131-36 (1961).
67. On more than one occasion, Pennsylvania courts have refrained from issuing pro-
cess against a coordinate branch because of the court's lack of ability to enforce its order. See
Hamilton v. Pinchot, 34 Dauph. 363 (1931) (refusal to issue injunction against the Governor);
see also Butcher v. Rice, 397 Pa. 158, 182, 153 A.2d 869, 881 (1959) (dissent states that the
majority's concern for lack of judicial power is a "strange and novel doctrine" in modern day
Pennsylvania).
68. Hartranft, 85 Pa. at 446.
69. Id. at 450,
70. Cf. Rice v. The Governor, 207 Mass. 577, 580, 93 N.E. 821, 823 (1911) (Governor
The separation of powers doctrine was another factor, if not the
main one, that influenced the court's decision in Hartranft. The ma-
jority believed the tripartite nature of government required that the
Governor could not be compelled to reveal information he had re-
ceived while acting in his official capacity. 1 Adopting a strict and
literal view of the separation of powers doctrine, the majority appar-
ently based its holding on the rationale that because the judiciary
and the executive were coordinate branches of the government, the
judiciary could not assert its authority over the Governor as chief
executive officer. 2
3. The Legacy of Hartranft's Appeal.-Since 1877, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to redefine the
contours of the executive privilege enunciated in Hartranft. Lower
court rulings on the scope of executive privilege, however, show a
clear trend toward limiting the absolutist position taken in
Hartranft.
7 3
For example, in Commonwealth v. Mellon National Bank &
Trust Co.,7 4 a national bank had brought an action alleging that a
certain state tax law was unconstitutional. The lower court ruled
that the bank was entitled to a subpoena duces tecum requiring the
Secretary of Revenue to produce reports filed by approximately one
thousand banks for the year in question. 5
is answerable only to his conscience, the electorate and a court of impeachment). The rule of
statutory construction relied upon is that when the Constitution provides a single method for
accomplishing a particular purpose (i.e. impeachment), that method is exclusive. See Bow-
man's Case, 225 Pa. 364, 367, 74 A. 203, 204 (1909).
71. Comment, Discovery of Government Documents Under the Federal Rules, 18 U.
CH. L. REV. 122, 124 n.15 (1950).
72. The Hartranft majority apparently viewed governmental branches as being mutu-
ally exclusive and absolutely independent of one another:
[T]he executive department is a co-ordinate branch of the government, with the
power to judge what should or should not be kept secret, and that with it, in the
exercise of these constitutional powers, the courts have no more right to inter-
fere, than has the executive under like conditions, to interfere with the courts.
Hartranft, 85 Pa. at 445.
73. See Edris' Estate, 25 Pa. C.C. 377 (Lebanon C.P. 1901) (principle of Hartranft
not extended to officers of national banks); Klein v. Commonwealth, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 792
(Allegheny C.P. 1956) (annoyance to the government is insufficient grounds to deprive plain-
tiffs of their right to discovery; state's objections to interrogatories filed by plaintiff are over-
ruled). Evidentiary handbooks also demonstrate the narrowing of what was originally thought
to be a broad privilege. Compare WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 513 at 421
(8th ed. 1880) (state executives entitled to determine to what extent they will produce papers
in a judicial inquiry) with WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 577 at 111 (13th ed.
1973) (it is for the courts and not the executive branch to determine whether government's
claim of privilege is well-founded).
74. 58 Dauph. 445, 62 Pa. D. & C. 105 (1947), afl'd, 360 Pa. 130, 61 A.2d 430
(1948).
75. The Secretary argued that it would be against the best interests of the state to have
a "wholesale removal" of the reports because it would interfere with the orderly disposition of
claims of other banks and would cause considerable inconvenience for department officials.
Mellon, 58 Dauph. at 457, 62 Pa. D. & C. at 121. The court's answer to that argument was
After reviewing the import of Gray, Hartranft and other deci-
sions, the lower court reached two conclusions. The first was that the
chief executive officials of the Commonwealth may not be taken
from the performance of their official duties under a subpoena duces
tecum to distant parts of the state.76 The second principle was that
the official may initially determine whether the public interest de-
manded the nondisclosure of certain information. The court ruled,
however, that the discretion of the official was not absolute and was
reviewable on appeal." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court on appeal
did not take advantage of the opportunity to rule on these two prin-
ciples. Instead it chose to affirm the lower court decision on other
grounds.
78
But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did, in an earlier case, ex-
pand on the meaning of Hartranft. In Harding v. Pinchot,79 the
plaintiff sought to enjoin the Governor and other executive officials
from issuing and enforcing an allegedly political pledge printed on
applications for notary public positions. Arguing for the Governor,
the Attorney General cited Hartranft in support of his contention
that there was no jurisdiction over the Governor."0 The Attorney
I
that the Secretary could not defeat the administration of justice and uphold his illegal conduct
by pleading the inconvenience of supplying the proper evidence. Id. Accord Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (executive privilege can not be used to shield executive officers
from criminal prosecution).
76. Mellon, 58 Dauph. at 456, 62 Pa. D. & C. at 121. The court held that this princi-
ple did not apply to the instant situation because the court was in Harrisburg and the Secre-
tary did not personally have to appear; he could authorize a taxing officer to produce the
documents and supply the necessary information at trial. Id.
77. Id.
78. Commonwealth v. Mellon National Bank and Trust Co., 360 Pa. 103, 61 A.2d 430
(1940). The Supreme Court relied on the construction of statutes under which the tax was
collected. The statutes provided that the tax reports in question would be kept confidential
"except for official purposes." 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 733-302, 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 731. The
court held that the purpose of the statutes was to prevent voluntary disclosures and not to
prohibit production of records necessary to judicial proceedings. Mellon, 360 Pa. at 110-111,
61 A.2d at 434.
The court seemed to imply that the existence of the statutes stripped the department of its
ability to make disclosure determinations. The court commented that the intent of the statutes
was not to permit the Commonwealth to shield itself behind a public policy rule by alleging
that production of the information would be detrimental to the public interest when no such
detriment was shown thereby thwarting a proper judicial investigation of facts. The statutes
instead were to allow records to be subpoenaed with "the manner and the extent of the disclos-
ure of the contents of such records [to] . . . remain under the discretionary control of the trial
judge." Id. at 112, 61 A.2d at 435 (emphasis added).
Without directly addressing Hartranft, the court stated in a footnote that if, in a trial, it
was proposed to subpoena or introduce evidence of facts whose disclosure would be prejudicial
to the public interest, "this court possessed the power upon cause shown to certiorari the entire
record before it and to make such order as right and justice requires." Id. at 112, 61 A.2d at
435 n.6 (emphasis added). Hartranft, however, established that the executive's claim of privi-
lege divested the court of its power to determine the admissibility of allegedly privileged docu-
ments. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. But it is doubtful that the Supreme Court in
Mellon intended to overrule Hartranft in a passing footnote.
79. Harding, 306 Pa. 139, 159 A. 167 (1932).
80. Id. at 141, 159 A. at 17.
General also apparently asserted in oral argument that the Governor
was immune from all judicial process. 81
The court dismissed the plaintiff's bill on grounds other than
those argued by the Attorney General.8 2 In dicta, the court did take
the opportunity to correct the Attorney General's interpretation of
Hartranft, stating that in the past the court has refrained from issu-
ing court processes against the Governor, not because of any judicial
inability to do so, but because of the deference due to him as a rep-
resentative of a coordinate branch. The court stated that Hartranft
did not divest the judiciary of its power to issue process against the
Governor "in an appropriate case."83 This statement leaves open the
question of whether a subpoena issued to the Governor, following the
Governor's determination that certain information should be with-
held, constitutes an "appropriate case."
Harding raises more questions about executive privilege than it
answers. For instance, the court broadly proclaimed:
This court has at no time declared that, in our bounden duty to
protect the Constitution and constitutional rights of Pennsylva-
nia citizens, we may not in extreme cases restrain even the Gov-
ernor. Although it is true that we will not issue judicial process
to the chief executive except in a case of magnitude, yet where
his action is in conflict with constitutional provisions, it is still
the law that we retain the power thus to proceed .... 84
From this passage one cannot readily extract any definitive
statement on the constitutionality of an absolute executive privilege.
Nor is it easy to predict the effect this decision would have as au-
thority should the issue of executive privilege be squarely confronted
in a future case. The court in Harding reaffirmed its duty to protect
constitutional rights and stated that it can restrain even the Gover-
nor in fulfillment of that duty. But this passage obviously leaves on
essential question unanswered: Is a Governor's claim of an absolute
executive privilege "in conflict with constitutional provisions?" If so,
the courts may then issue process against the Governor if he at-
tempts to withhold subpoenaed documents under an executive privi-
lege claim. According to the unchallenged Hartranft decision, how-
ever, a Governor's claim of absolute executive privilege has its roots
in the Constitution.
81. Id. at 145, 159 A. at 18.
82. The court dismissed the bill on three grounds: (1) The pledge was too ambiguous to
be declared illegal; (2) the plaintiff failed to show a legal right to the position, and; (3) the
record failed to show that the government would incur any considerable expense in printing
the forms. Id. at 144, 159 A. at 17-18.
83. Id. at 145, 159 A. 18.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
Obviously, the constitutionality of an executive's claim of abso-
lute privilege was not an issue before the Harding court. Rather, the
issue was the Governor's amenability to an injunction. 85 The Har-
ding court mentioned Hartranft to note that case cannot be used to
support a claim of absolute executive immunity from all judicial pro-
ceedings. The court did state, however, that Hartranft stands for the
rule that when judicial process attempts to compel the Governor to
turn over documents, and he answers that the requested order would
interfere with the performance of his executive duties, the courts will
not issue mandamus to compel him to act.86 This rule actually sup-
ports the concept of executive privilege to the extent it indicates that
courts will rely on and not question the chief executive's determina-
tion of the effect a court order has on his duties. The Governor's
answer is taken as sufficient on its face without any judicial scrutiny.
The court's language in Harding also indicates that the great
weight accorded executive determinations concerning the nondisclo-
sure of confidential documents does not outweigh the judiciary's fun-
damental interest in administering justice. The court cited a famous
Pennsylvania case on judicial review which affirmed the independent
power of the judiciary to enforce constitutional limitations on the
other branches.87 The court also quoted a constitutional provision as-
suring "due course of law" and guaranteeing "open courts" to every
person.88 The juxtaposition of this constitutional guarantee with the
doctrine of judicial review does not provide a favorable context to
85. Harding provides limited guidance on the issue of executive privilege because the
action contemplated in Harding was an injunction and not a subpoena. Harding could be
viewed as merely reaffirming the well-established principle that the Governor, like any other
public official, is amenable to injunction or mandamus should a court declare that he is acting
unconstitutionally. See generally Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d
193 (1971) (court will order mandamus against city council to appropriate funds necessary for
the operation of the court system). See also T. WHITE, CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 276-
77 (1907) (courts may restrain executive officer if he is acting unconstitutionally and in so
doing court can resort to the usual process).
An injunction and a subpoena are similar because they are both forms of compulsory
process. When courts decide the propriety of issuing either of these orders, they consider both
the separation of powers principle and the doctrine of judicial review.
But lurking behind the issuance of a subpoena is the question of executive privilege. When
considering this question, lines between the branches are more sharply drawn since both the
executive and the judiciary stake their claim in the Constitution and its structure. Moreover,
fundamentally different policies are at work when a chief executive claims a privilege - poli-
cies not present when an injunction is sought. See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
86. Harding, 306 Pa. at 145, 159 A. at 18.
87. Id. at 145, 159 A. at 18 (quoting Dechastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 20 (1850)).
88. The constitutional section provides in part that "All Courts shall be open; and
every man for an injury done him . . . shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay." PA. CONST. art. I, § 11. An absolute execu-
tive privilege, whatever its other characteristics, has the effect of "closing courts" to persons
seeking remedy by denying relevant evidence to those individuals. "Due course of law" may
also be threatened when litigants are denied an orderly trial and deprived of necessary means
of proof.
assert an absolute executive privilege.
Harding provides no firm answers to the question concerning
the continued validity of an absolute executive privilege. The lan-
guage in the decision points to inconsistent conclusions. Selective ex-
cerpts could be used to support either an absolute or qualified privi-
lege. Based on the status of the case law at the current time, the
concept of an absolute executive privilege continues to be the rule of
law in Pennsylvania. In short, Hartranft is still "good law."89
IV. An Assessment of the Pennsylvania View: Is an Absolute Exec-
utive Privilege a Valid and Supportable Doctrine?
A. A Critical Analysis of The Pennsylvania Case Law
As stated above, Gray and Hartranft are still the rule of law in
Pennsylvania by force of stare decisis. Viewed together, the impact
of these two decisions establishes an absolute executive privilege for
the chief executive; the Governor conclusively determines the scope
and applicability of the privilege. Once the Governor makes a deter-
mination not to disclose requested information to protect the public
interest, judicial inquiry into the merits of his claim is precluded.
The Pennsylvania case law establishing this doctrine of absolute ex-
ecutive privilege is open to criticism from two angles. First, the rea-
soning in the cases themselves often proves to be fallacious upon
close examination. Second, the underlying premises behind the
courts' reasoning is at many points rendered obsolete by modern day
developments.
In Gray v. Pentland, the court granted the Governor absolute
and unreviewable discretion in his decision not to disclose the re-
quested deposition. As noted above, the court employed a rationale
that reflected the policy behind the informant's9 and official infor-
mation privilege. 91
The analogy between the informant's privilege and the Gray
scenario is weak. The informant's privilege is generally applied to
those reporting violations of criminal law when the public interest in
safety and crime prevention is thought to be imperative.92 Gray, on
the other hand, was a civil proceeding, 93 and the information re-
89. As late as 1959, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court aflirmed, by way of dictum, the
holding in Hartranft that the Governor is exempt from court [.rocess when engaging in any
duty pertaining to his office. See Costello v. Rice, 397 Pa. 198, 204, 153 A.2d 888, 892 (1959).
90. See supra p. 12.
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
93. It should be emphasized that Gray arose in a civil proceeding. The need for secur-
ing all relevant evidence in a private dispute is arguably not .s strong as it would be in a
criminal trial where the offense is against the public. Moreover, ihe consequences of nondisclo-
sure could be viewed as more damaging to a criminal defendant facing a deprivation of liberty
ceived by the Governor was deemed worthy of protection because of
its value to the executive decision making process. On policy
grounds, it is questionable if the Governor's interest in receiving un-
solicited and unsubstantiated charges from an ordinary citizen con-
cerning job incompetence is as strong as the prosecutor's interest in
receiving information concerning possible violations of the criminal
law from an informant proven to be reliable. The potential for abuse,
in order to serve political ends, appears greater in the former in-
stance. 94 In both instances recognition of the privilege derogates the
search for truth, yet it is questionable whether the governmental
ends protected in each situation are indeed equivalent in weight.
The Gray court also relied on the rationale underlying the offi-
cial information privilege. In one respect, the result reached in Gray
is desirable to the extent that it recognizes the executive's legitimate
need for confidentiality. As noted above, federal courts have long
recognized an official information privilege. Further, this privilege
has not been limited exclusively to high federal officials. 95 The need
for candor and secrecy, which the privilege protects, is just as strong
among confidants of the Governor as it is among the advisors to the
President.
In another respect, the result reached in Gray is open to criti-
cism because it grants the executive an official information privilege
that is absolute on its own terms. The single word of the executive
could well deny a litigant his only means of proof. The executive's
decision on nondisclosure contravenes the well-established policy of
favoring full access by the courts and litigants to relevant evidence
as a means to achieve justice in individual lawsuits.96 The court's
major task of controlling and hearing all the evidence and justly de-
termining the cause is thwarted when the claim of an executive priv-
than to the civil litigant seeking or defending the right to financial compensation. Because of
these differences the chief executive may be in a weaker position to assert the privilege in cases
where a criminal violation is at issue.
In both civil and criminal trials, however, the judiciary has a duty to ensure due process
for each participant in the adversary process. In the Gray case, the judiciary's duties and the
litigant's needs apparently yielded to the interests of the chief executive. For example, the
court stated:
It is not to be presumed that [the Governor] will protect a wanton and malicious
libeler; even if he should, it is better that a few of the guilty escape, than should
a precedent be established by which innocent persons may be involved in trouble.
Gray, 2 Serg. & Rawle at 31 (Tilgham, C.J.) (emphasis added).
In the balancing process employed by the Gray court, the executive's interest in protecting
government sources of information outweighs the detrimental effect this protection might have
on the fair administration of justice.
94. See Note, Evidence - Three Nonpersonal Privileges, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 194 (1954)
(argues that courts disfavor privilege claims made by state and local governments out of a
desire to provide a safeguard against corruption).
95. See Crawford v. Dominic, 469 F. Supp. 260, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
96. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
ilege is taken at face value.
In contrast to the position in Gray, which granted the Governor
unreviewable discretion, the federal courts halre long held that the
official information privilege is not absolute.97 No blanket privilege
exists that is activated by the executive's command. Rather, the ap-
plicability of the privilege is determined by thi courts on a case by
case basis. 9" In order to determine if the executive privilege has been
properly invoked in a certain case, federal courts have developed a
list of considerations to assist them in their ta;k.99
In regard to the Hartranft case, the reascns cited by the court
to support its decision are vulnerable to criticism. 100 The first reason
rested on an assumption that judicial inspections must always be
public. 1'0 This is no longer true because in camera inspections now
provide a viable means for a judge to inspect ti e allegedly privileged
documents privately.102 To the extent Hartranft relies on the as-
97. See Dos Santos v. O'neil, 62 F.R.D. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
98. See Dennis v. Carey, 78 F.R.D. 370 (ED. Pa. 1978); Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59
F.R.D. 339 (1973).
99. The Frankenhauser court listed considerations to b examined in the context of
discovery of police investigation files in a civil rights suit. Some of these considerations apply
with equal force when documents of the Governor are sought to be discovered, including:
( I) the extent to which disclosure will thwart government, I processes by discour-
aging citizens from giving the government information;(,) the degree to which
governmental self-evaluation and consequent program improvement will be chil-
led by disclosure;(3) whether the information sought is factual data or evaluative
summary;(4) whether the plaintiff's suit is non-frivolous and brought in good
faith;(5) whether the information sought is available through other discovery or
from other sources;(6) the importance of the information ! ought to the plaintiff's
case.
Frankenhauser, 59 F.R.D. at 344.
100. Hartranft is one of the few cases on either the state cr federal level to confront the
question of a chief executive's amenability to subpoena. Because Hartranft stands as definitive
case authority in favor of an absolute executive privilege, presilential counsel often cite the
decision as being representative of the common law. See, e.g. 40 Ops. Atty. Gen. 45, 49
(1941) (Hartranft cited as support for the proposition that the e):ecutive has the final determi-
nation whether production of papers would be against public initerest). The rationale of the
Hartranft majority clearly provided a conceptual underpinning for the arguments of the Presi-
dent's attorneys in the Watergate tapes litigation. See Nixon v. 5,irica, 487 F.2d at 753 (Presi-
dent wrote letter to Judge Sirica stating that the President and he Governor of several states
are not bound to produce papers when they decide disclosure %ould be inexpedient).
In addition to extensive citation, Hartranft has also been incorrectly applied to support an
executive privilege vis-a-vis legislative requests for information. I:ee Statement of Acting Post-
master General Before Special Subcommittee of the Senate Post Office and Civil Service
Committee, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1948) (refusing to present t) the committee investigative
reports prepared by post office inspectors).
The use of Hartranft to support an executive privilege against legislative demands is inap-
propriate since Hartranft itself recognized that the Governor had a constitutional duty to re-
port information to the General Assembly. Hartranft, 85 Pa. a. 450. Cf. Younger, Congres-
sional Investigations and Executive Secrecy, 20 U. Pirr. L. RE". 755, 777-78 n.7 (notes that
Hartranft court uses language which implies judicial attitude on executive's power to withhold
information from the legislature).
101. See supra p. 12.
102. Wigmore terms the failure of some courts to consider the use of in camera inspec-
tion as "ludicrous." 8 WIGMORE § 2379, supra note 1, at 812 11.6.
sumption that judicial inquiries are always public, the privilege Har-
tranft established should no longer be valid.1"'
The second line of reasoning that influenced the Hartranft court
was a reluctance to interfere with the functioning of the executive
branch. Fearful of disruptive intervention, the court stated that the
Governor was to determine his official duties and the circumstances
permitting him to appear before a grand jury. l0 4 The result of the
court's reasoning is unsatisfactory in several respects. 105 If Hartranft
is taken as establishing that the Governor is exempt from process
whenever engaged in "official" duties, and if Hartranft further pos-
tulates that the Governor is the sole classifier of his actions as "offi-
cial" or "non-official," the Governor essentially has absolute execu-
tive immunity in all circumstances. By simply labeling his action as
"official" the Governor raises a shield of immunity enabling him to
perpetrate the greatest of frauds and evils against the public.' 06
103. Federal courts have effectively employed the in camera inspection device as a
means to balance the executive's need for secrecy against a litigant's right to know. For in-
stance, the Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds, while recognizing that the court must
determine the privilege, warned that such a determination must be made "without forcing a
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.
Sensitive to the limited intrusions on executive secrecy that result from even in camera
inspections, the federal courts have developed safeguards to prevent unwarranted disclosures.
For example, Reynolds has been read to mean that a court should not always order an in
camera inspection as a matter of course. See Carl Zeiss, 440 F.R.D. at 331. Accordingly,
courts have required a preliminary showing of necessity before they will agree to examine
allegedly privileged documents. See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463
F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1971), application for injunction denied, 404 U.S. 917 (1971).
These cases show that while the assumption behind Hartranft of public judicial examina-
tion has been vitiated, Hartranft's concern for executive secrecy remains valid. Federal courts
have been able to accommodate the executive's legitimate interest in confidentiality by effec-
tive use of the in camera procedure.
104. See supra p. 13. The court reasoned that the public duties of the Governor else-
where prevented his attendance before the grand jury. Hartranft, 85 Pa. at 449. In 1877,
transportation difficulties and delays may well have been part of the reason for the court's
reluctance to force the Governor to leave the seat of the government. See Rotunda, Presidents
and Ex-Presidents as Witnesses: A Brief Historical Footnote, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 7 n.24
(1975). This consideration is obviously negated in an age of rapid transportation and ready
communication.
105. Although the result reached in Hartranft may be undesirable, the majority does
express a well-founded concern for the smooth functioning of the executive branch. Obviously
a Chief Executive cannot spend all of his time criss-crossing the state responding to court
orders. Some protection is needed against vexatious judicial orders issued for purposes of polit-
ical harassment. Accordingly, courts have repeatedly held that high government officials are
entitled to deference in discovery due to the demands of the office. See Wirtz v. Local No. 30,
34 F.R.D. 13, 14 (S.D. N.Y. 1963). To protect officials from undue harassment, the courts
have required the person seeking to depose officials to show (I) that the depositions are clearly
essential to prevent prejudice or injustice and (2) that the deponent will clearly have relevant
information that cannot be obtained elsewhere. See Sykes v. Brown, 90 F.R.D. 77 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (Director of Defense Logistics Agency); Hyland v. Smollock, 137 N.J. Super. 456, 349
A.2d 541 (1975) (State Attorney General and Director of Criminal Justice). See also Laskaris
v. Thornburgh, No. 80-178 Erie (W. D. Pa. filed Mar. 8, 1982) (motion for protective order
forbidding depositions and quashing subpoenas that were served on Governor and Secretary of
Transportation).
106. The dissent has several answers to the majority's concerns about judicial interfer-
ence with executive duties. In the dissent's view, the argument that the Governor must always
The third line of reasoning underlying thi Hartranft decision,
the fear of executive disobedience,107 has beer criticized by courts
and commentators. 0 8 Federal courts have consistently rejected the
position that the lack of judicial enforcement power should control
the court's resolution of the issues. 0 9 Instead, a court's obligation to
render justice and to decide the case on thc merits is correctly
viewed as transcending any qualms about post-judgment enforce-
ment. Once physical power becomes a deterrrinant in the judicial
equation, litigants yield to judicial pronouncements not because of
respect for the process but because of the fear of brute force."1'
be at the seat of the government is "preposterous" in view of hi! frequent visits elsewhere on
business or pleasure. The dissent suggests the potential for abuse should the Governor himself
determine the character of his official duties and points out that at the time of the riots, the
Governor was not in physical command as the majority intimates, but rather was in the Rock-
ies on his way to California. Hartranft, 85 Pa. at 457 (Agnew, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the dissent correctly notes that should the Gov,.rnor be compelled to comply
with the court order, the state would not be left without a head. Instead the Lieutenant-Gover-
nor, pursuant to the State Constitution, would assume the power; and duties of Governor. Id.
at 461 (Agnew, J., dissenting).
107. See supra p. 13.
108. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 8. 5, at 591 n.45 (1958); Har-
din, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 819 (1962).
109. See Sirica 487 F.2d at 708 (lack of physical power does not prevent court from
deciding otherwise justiciable issue); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360
F. Supp. I, 3 (D.D.D. 1973) (court has duty to issue subpoeras regardless of its physical
power to enforce them).
110. In both Gray and Hartranft the Governor was not a party. When the Governor is a
nonparty to a suit, the courts are at their weakest in enforcing their judgments. Courts nor-
mally rely on the executive branch for enforcement of their orde's. This pattern of reliance is
obviously upset when the Governor is the subject of the order. The normal mechanism for
enforcing compliance of a nonparty - the contempt order - may be inappropriate and infea-
sible. If the Governor chose to defy the court order, he would en. oy a privilege of nonenforce-
ment because the courts could not prevail over the physical pow(:r of the executive. The ineq-
uity of the situation when the Governor is a nonparty is apparelnt; a private litigant could be
penalized with an adverse judgment because of the executihe's refusal to disclose vital
evidence.
Different considerations apply, however, when the Governor is a party to a suit. If the
Governor is a plaintiff, the court can indirectly force complianze with its subpoena by dis-
missing the complaint on the ground that the refusal to disclose s) prejudiced the defendant as
to preclude a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton Valle:. Operator Comm., 9 F.R.D.
719 (W.D. La. 1949) (civil suit brought by federal governmen! dismissed when government
refused to produce documents), affd by equally divided court, 339 U.S. 940 (1950). If the
Governor is a defendant, the court may indirectly enforce its subpoena by deeming as estab-
lished, for purposes of the case, the matter that the plaintiff souE ht to show by disclosure. See
Center for Corporate Responsibility v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 868 (D.D.C. 1973); O'Neil v.
United States, 79 F. Supp. 827, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
Even in the situation where the Governor is a nonparty, there are two factors mitigating
against an outright confrontation between the executive and judi,:ial branches. The first factor
lies in public opinion. While the Governor may have the physical power to defy openly a court
order, such a position might be politically dangerous. Thus, popt lar opinion and adverse pub-
licity may well pressure the Governor into complying with the orler. See Kramer & Marcuse,
Executive Privilege - A Study of the Period 1953-1960 (pts 1-2), GEo. WASH. L. REV. 623,
910 (1961) (executive privilege is a "two-edged sword"; interest to be protected may be out-
balanced by adverse inferences that privilege produces); see also Comment, Executive Privi-
lege at the State Level, supra note 5, at 638 (public reaction lo gubernatorial disobedience
likely to be more cynical than if President defies court).
The second factor is that the court can delay enforcement of its contempt sanction until
Related to the fear of executive disobedience is the argument
advanced by the Hartranft majority that impeachment and the vot-
ing booth are the only remedies available should the Governor diso-
bey the court's order."1 Pennsylvania cases subsequent to Hartranft,
however, have effectually refuted the view that impeachment and the
electoral process are the sole remedies in cases of executive miscon-
duct.11 2 The federal courts also have rejected the claim that the im-
peachment clause works to remove the power of the courts to issue
process against a Chief Executive. 113 Impeachment is intended to be
a final remedy in excessive cases; it is not a reasonable solution when
only a few suffer the consequences of executive abuse." 4
The fourth line of reasoning relied on by the Hartranft court,
the separation of powers doctrine, warrants extensive treatment be-
cause of the majority's particular view of a tripartite government.
Additionally, the separation of powers doctrine merits close analysis
because the doctrine is essentially the linchpin in any argument for
an absolute executive privilege. The concept of an executive privilege
and the doctrine of separation of powers are also closely interrelated
in that both the privilege and the doctrine find their roots in the
structure of the Constitution.
B. Assessing the Absolute Executive Privilege in the Context of
the Separation of Powers Doctrine
1. The Design and Operation of a Tripartite Government.-In
order to probe the constitutional basis of a claim of an absolute exec-
utive privilege, it is useful to look to the overall design or intent of
the framers in establishing a tripartite government. Basically, two
theories have emerged concerning the design and operation of a tri-
partite government; the "watertight" compartmental theory and the
the Governor leaves office. This solution avoids the confrontation courts are reluctant to engage
in, yet preserves the coercive effect of the contempt sanction. See Comment, Executive Privi-
lege: What Are the Limits?, 54 OR. L. REv. 81, 98 (1975). This solution of suspending en-
forcement while an official is in office has precedent in Pennsylvania law. See In re Application
by Election Officers, I Brewster 182 (1868) (immunity granted to electors during pendency of
election).
I 11. To contend that impeachment is the only available remedy when a Governor ig-
nores a court order misinterprets the purpose of the impeachment process. The aim of an
impeachment proceeding is to remove an official from office because the official's capacity to
serve is the issue to be determined. In contrast, a court's order requiring compliance with a
subpoena is concerned with less drastic consequences and objectives. The only question existing
when the court seeks to enforce its subpoena is whether the Governor has failed to comply.
112. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kirk, 141 Pa. Super. 123, 125, 14 A.2d 914, 920
(1940), affd, 340 Pa. 346, 17 A.2d 195 (1941).
113. See Sirica, 487 F.2d at 711 (impeachment clause, by contemplating post-impeach-
ment trials for criminal violations committed in office, reveals that the fact of incumbency does
not relieve President of routine legal obligations).
114. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 5 n.9 (D.D.C.
1973).
mixing or blending theory. " 5
The watertight compartmental theory posits that each branch of
government is mutually exclusive and absolutely independent of the
others. 1 6 Any overlap of powers is strictly prohibited. The Hartranft
majority apparently subscribed to the watertight compartmental the-
ory. According to the Hartranft majority, the Governor reigned su-
preme in all matters within the executive department. His decisions
were final and free from interference by another governmental
branch."
7
The watertight compartmental theory has not, however,
emerged as the predominant view of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. " 8 The weight of authority in both the federal and state courts
supports a mixing or blending theory of separation of powers. " 9 In
order for there to be a workable government, courts have recognized
that some degree of interaction and cooperation among the three
branches is needed.'" 0 Under the pragmatic approach embodied in
the blending theory, courts have the duty to say what the law is even
if it entails restraining unauthorized legislative or executive acts. 21
115. See Carrow & Reese, State Problems of Mass Adjudicative Justice: The Adminis-
trative Adjudications of Traffic Violations - A Case Study, 28 AD. L. REV. 223 (1976).
116. Id. at 232-34, 251-52.
117. See Hartranft, 85 Pa. at 445.
118. See Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 262, 378 A.2d 780, 783 (1977) (doc-
trine of separation of powers not intended to "hermetically seal off" the three branches; the
doctrine intended that there would be a degree of interdependence). See also Commonwealth
ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 52, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (1971) (dividing lines between
respective branches are incapable of precise definition).
119. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 (framers did not want each branch to operate with
absolute independence). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (Constitution contemplates that practice will integrate
dispersed powers into a workable government).
120. The dissent in Hartranft reflects the predominant view when it states that coordi-
nation or equality of rank under the Constitution is not equivalent to the absolute indepen-
dence of each branch. For the dissent, coordination merely meant the vesting of the separate
functions of making, determining, and executing laws. The distribution of powers into three
distinct branches implied that each was "necessarily supreme in its department." One of these
"superior" and "exclusive" functions was the judiciary's duty to detect, try, and punish viola-
tors of the law. When this judicial power was involved, the dissent stated, the Governor, just as
any other citizen, must yield his obedience to the process necessary for the exercise of the
judiciary's function. Hartranft, 85 Pa. at 456 (Agnew, J., dissenting).
121. See Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 2), 332 Pa. 342,
352-53, 2 A.2d 804, 807 (1938) (adoption of 1873 Constitution reaffirmed the doctrine of
separation of powers, which included the judicial power to restrain unauthorized executive
acts). As opposed to the blending or mixing theory, the watertight compartmental theory,
when logically extended to its extreme, would apparently sanction criminal misconduct by the
chief executive. Because the powers of the separate branches are narrowly confined to the
respective departments under the watertight compartmental theory, the courts are incapable of
intervening in the executive branch in any manner, regardless of the circumstances. Taken to
the extreme, this would render the courts powerless to restrain even palpably illegal acts on the
part of the Governor.
In contrast to the extreme view that is possible under the watertight compartmental the-
ory, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that no person, including the
Governor, is above the law. See, e.g., Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings
2. The Purposes of The Separation of Powers Doctrine and
How They Relate to the Claim of an Absolute Executive Privi-
lege.-In addition to examining the design or operation of a tripar-
tite form of government, it is also valuable to analyze the purposes
behind the separation of powers doctrine. 22 Once the underlying
purposes of the separation of powers doctrine are identified, those
purposes can provide a ready benchmark by which to assess the con-
stitutional validity of an absolute executive privilege. For example, to
the extent that an absolute privilege concept is consistent with and
furthers the purposes behind the separation of powers doctrine, it
can be fairly argued that the privilege should be recognized. Con-
versely, to the extent that an absolute privilege concept is inconsis-
tent with and contravenes the purposes underlying the separation of
powers doctrine, it is safe to say that the privilege should not be
recognized.
The principal reason for the doctrine of separation of powers is
to guard against an excessive concentration of powers in a single
body. 2' "It was believed [by the framers] that each branch would
act as a check on the other and by this diffusion of powers prevent
tyranny where the rights of the individual citizen would be ig-
nored."124 Arbitrary governmental dealings with private rights were
to be prevented by allocating an appropriate function to each depart-
ment of the government. 12 5 To counteract the potential for tyranny
within the executive branch, the "appropriate function" of the judi-
ciary was to provide "open courts" and "due course of law."' 26
With respect to this purpose of preventing the concentration of
governmental power, the concept of an executive privilege has been
recognized as a "flaw in democratic philosophy.' 27 The recognition
of an absolute executive privilege would consolidate rather than dif-
fuse governmental power. To leave the decision concerning the dis-
closure of requested information to the head of an executive depart-
ment has the effect of making that person the judge in an action in
which he himself has an interest-an unfamiliar situation in the An-
(No. 1) 332 Pa. 289, 2 A.2d 783 (1938) (framers never intended criminal immunity for Gov-
ernor and his subordinates).
122. Although not expressly included in the Pennsylvania Constitution, the separation of
powers doctrine has been found by the State Supreme Court to be an inherent part of the
government. See Bailey v. Waters, Auditor General, 308 Pa. 309, 313, 168 A.2d 819, 821
(1932).
123. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison) at 330, 335 (Heritage Press 1945) (de-
partmental structure intended to prevent tyrranical concentration of powers of government).
124. Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 269, 378 A.2d 780, 786-87 (1977).
125. See Bagg's Appeal, 7 Wright 512, 515 (Pa. 1862) Ervine's Appeal, 4 Harris 256,
268 (Pa. 1851).
126. Bagg's Appeal, 7 Wright at 515.
127. Younger, Congressional Investigations and Executive Secrecy. A Study in the Sep-
aration of Powers, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 755, 783 (1959).
glo-Saxon legal tradition. Furthermore, granting the chief executive
unchecked discretion as to when the claim will be invoked opens the
door for "arbitrary governmental dealings with private rights." With
an absolute privilege, the Governor is free to assert the privilege on
any basis he pleases because his discretion is unreviewable by the
courts.
Vesting the chief executive with absolute discretion regarding
what matters will be divulged to a court invites abuse that the doc-
trine of separation of powers was designed to prevent. For the chief
executive, an absolute privilege provides ample protection against
disruptive disclosures of misconduct. By simply claiming that certain
information is privileged, the head of an executive branch is able to
cover up all evidence of fraud and corruption should there be an
investigation of departmental misconduct. 28 Consequently, the pur-
pose behind the separation of powers doctrine-ensuring a govern-
ment of laws instead of men' 29-- is thwarted when a chief executive,
under the guise of an executive privilege, is able to violate criminal
laws and breach the public trust.
Moreover, the assertion of the executive privilege in an ongoing
trial, to the extent that it denies demonstrably relevant evidence to a
litigant, effectively deprives that litigant of "due course of law."130
The assurance of "open courts" ultimately is impaired because the
flat assertion of the executive denies the judiciary their power to con-
trol the admission of evidence.1 31
Because the concept of an absolute executive privilege clashes
with the purpose of preventing tyranny and preserving rights, the
scope of that privilege should be construed as narrowly as possible.
Another purpose advanced for the establishment of a tripartite gov-
ernment is a concern for the smooth workings of government. 32 In
one respect, the framers intended each of the three separate
branches to act as a restraint on the others. But the founding fathers
also wanted to avoid government by stalemate and contemplated
that the coordinate powers of government would harmoniously coop-
128. See, e.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility 436 F.2d at 793-94.
129. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 292 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
130. When the executive privilege is invoked during the course of criminal prosecution,
the possibility of conflict with three important defendant rights is likely. These rights are: the
right to confront witnesses; the right to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his
favor: and the right to due process under the Pennsylvania and Federal constitutions. U.S.
CONST. amend. V, amend. VI; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
131. The Supreme Court recognized the debilitating effect privileges have on the func-
tion of court's when it labeled privileges "exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence"
which derogate the search for truth. As such, privileges are not to be "lightly created nor
expansively construed." Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710.
132. See Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 52, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (1971); Leahey v.
Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 57, 66 A.2d 577, 579 (1949).
erate with each other. 113 Viewed in this regard, the recognition of a
privilege is desirable in that it provides a clear-cut method of resolv-
ing inter-branch disputes concerning the disclosure of confidential
information.""
On closer analysis of the historical underpinnings of the Ameri-
can Revolution, however, it becomes clear that a concern for the
smooth workings of government never was the major or even a minor
force behind the separation of powers doctrine. 135 If operational effi-
ciency was a major objective of the framers, they could have created
a dictatorship. Instead they envisioned a government marked by ten-
sions and balances of power. Based on their experiences under auto-
cratic rule in England, it appears reasonable that the main impetus
for the framers in establishing a tripartite form of government was
to avoid tyranny. 36 To the extent the executive privilege serves a
contrary purpose, its applicability and scope should be limited.
3. Analyzing Executive Privilege By Use of the Political
Question Doctrine; Is an Executive Privilege Claim a Nonjusticiable
Political Question?-Another way to assess the constitutional valid-
ity of an executive privilege, as it relates to the separation of powers
doctrine, is to apply the political question doctrine. Both the Penn-
sylvania and United States Supreme Courts have recognized that the
political question doctrine is a function of the separation of pow-
ers.137 As such, the political question doctrine rests on the position
that the Constitution commits the final determination of some consti-
tutional questions to agencies other than the courts.'3 8 Underlying
this political question doctrine is the judicial recognition that certain
issues should be left for autonomous resolution by the operation of
the political process.13  Legal commentators 40 have suggested that
133. Although it is true that this efficiency consideration was not the principal impetus
behind the doctrine, courts should not "display a callous disregard to the effect of ... action
upon the efficient operation of a component part of our government when a dispute arises as to
their respective areas of responsibility." Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 269 n.9, 378
A.2d 780, 787 n.9 (1977).
134. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
135. See Meyers, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (separation of powers doc-
trine was adopted by Constitutional Convention not to promote efficiency but to preclude exer-
cise of arbitrary power); ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 358-71 (4th ed. 1980).
136. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 665 (6th Cir. 1971),
afid, 407 U.S. 297 (United States Constitution adopted in aftermath of abuses by King
George III; founders sought to provide check upon sovereign power).
137. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); Zemprelli v. Daniels, 496 Pa. 247, 253-
54, 436 A.2d 1165, 1168 (1981). Some writers have questioned the theoretical underpinnings
of the doctrine. See, e.g., Jackson, The Political Question Doctrine, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 447,
508-10 (1973); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517, 538-39 (1966).
138. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
7, 9 (1959).
139. Henkin, Is There A Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
the content and application of the executive privilege should be
viewed as one of these constitutional issues committed to another
branch for final decision. Under this view, the Governor's claim of
privilege is a nonjusticiable issue in the sense that the executive
rather than the courts should have the final authority to decide the
validity of the privilege.141
In Baker v. Carr,42 the United States Supreme Court held that
either of the following elements triggered political question treat-
ment of an issue: (1) a textually demonstrable commitment of the
particular issue to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the
issue. 143 The existence of either of these elements should cause a
court to refrain from considering the claim asserted.4
(a) Textual commitment requirement.-The first factor identi-
fied by the Baker Court, the existence of a "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment," essentially looks to the language of the
Constitution itself. The wording of the various sections of the Consti-
tution is examined to determine if the Constitution delegates the res-
olution of the particular issue to some department other than the
judiciary. If the language of the Constitution clearly dictates that
the issue is for some other branch, then that question is deemed to
be nonjusticiable and therefore inappropriate for judicial resolu-
tion. 4 5 In Pennsylvania, the responsibility for determining whether
the Constitution, by its language, commits an issue to a coordinate
department is one for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to decide "as
the ultimate interpreter of Pennsylvania's Constitution.' 48
140. See Dorsen and Shattuck, Executive Privilege, The Congress, and the Courts, 35
OHIO ST. L.J. I, 36-40 (1974); J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 26.6116.-41 at 26-
287 (2d ed. 1984).
141. Although the political question doctrine normally arises in conflicts between the
executive and legislative branches, the doctrine is equally applicable to the conflict between the
executive and judiciary branches that arises with the assertion of an executive privilege. In
both conflicts, the separation of powers is at the heart of the controversy. Further, Justice
Brennan, in Baker, stressed the need for "discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and
posture of the particular case." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. The political question doctrine does
not have any consistent attributes. Rather, the doctrine, as a grouping of considerations, ap-
plies with different emphasis in various phases of the law. Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689,
700 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The case by case approach suggested by these decisions indicates that
the political question doctrine should not be automatically labeled inappropriate for executive-
judicial disputes.
142. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
143. Id. at 217.
144. Zemprelli, 496 Pa. at 257, 436 A.2d at 1170.
145. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has rephrased the textual commitment
question as "[W]hether the Pennsylvania Constitution commits the power exclusively to one
branch for self-monitoring." Lewis v. Thornburgh, 68 Pa. Commw. 157, 162, 448 A.2d 680,
683 (1982).
146. Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 510, 375 A.2d 698, 706 (1977).
In applying the textual commitment requirement to a Gover-
nor's claim of an executive privilege, it can be observed that the
Pennsylvania Constitution makes no express mention of the privi-
lege. 1 7 Although the argument may be made that the privilege
could be implied from the existence of the executive power to exe-
cute the laws faithfully, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a
similar analysis in Sweeney v. Tucker. 4 8
In Sweeney, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court faced the ques-
tion whether the House of Representative's expulsion of a member
pursuant to article II, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
was a matter exclusively committed to that body and therefore not
subject to judicial review. Article II, section 11 explicitly gives each
House the power to determine the rules of its proceedings and the
power to expel a member with a two-thirds vote. 49 Admitting that
the question was a close one, the court nonetheless held that the pro-
ceedings employed by the House in expelling a member had not been
exclusively delegated to that body by the Pennsylvania Constitution.
As such, the proceedings employed in the case could be reviewed by
the judiciary when it is alleged that the House action violated a
member's right to procedural due process.'
147. The existence of a constitutional provision authorizing secret sessions of both
Houses and the absence of such an authorization for executive department meetings could very
well imply that the framers intended no such protection for executive secrecy, notwithstanding
the fact that executive officials regularly engage in policy making discussion much like that of
the General Assembly. PA. CONST. art. 11, § 13. See 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 385, 388 (1981).
The closest thing to a textual commitment in the Pennsylvania Constitution is a provision
stating that the Governor may require information from officers of the Executive Department
about any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices. PA. CONST. art. IV, § 10. To
extrapolate an executive privilege to withhold documents from a court based on this permissive
language proves too much. In view of the founder's strong distrust of concentrated executive
power, it is doubtful they intended a privilege for the Governor based on the innocuous lan-
guage in article V, section 10. Further, the constitutional debates on this section reveals there
was little substantive discussion among the members of the Convention on the intended impact
of this provision. See Proceedings Relative to the Calling of the Conventions of 1776 and 1790
(1825).
148. 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977); see also Zemprelli, 496 Pa. at 247, 436 A.2d at
1165 (1981) (Senate's interpretation of a constitutional requirement that gubernatorial ap-
pointments be confirmed by a majority of the members elected to the senate is not a political
question).
149. PA. CoNsT. art. I!, § 11.
150. Sweeney, 473 Pa. at 517, 375 A.2d at 709. Underlying the Sweeney Court's hold-
ing that the expulsion procedures were not a political question was the claimant's allegation
that the House action had violated his federal constitutional rights. As noted earlier, the claim
of an executive privilege in a criminal trial could well trigger the guarantees of due process.
See supra note 130. Even in a civil context, the chief executive's refusal to comply with a
subpoena could violate the litigant's due process rights. The due process clause has been
viewed as encompassing those rights fundamental to ordered liberty. See Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) (refining
the Palko test). The due process clause also serves as a guarantee against arbitrary govern-
ment action. See Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937).
These vital rights and guarantees would be useless should the court be deprived of the power to
secure executive compliance with its orders. When the court order is a subpoena, the violation
of due process is compounded because the effect of executive disobedience is to disrupt the
The significance of the Sweeney holding on executive privilege is
that if judicial review was appropriate in Sweeney, despite the
court's recognition of a specific constitutional provision granting each
House control over its own membership, then judicial review should
also be appropriate in the context of an executive privilege where
there is no such express authority. The Sweeney court made it clear
that the court was looking for an unambiguous textual commitment
particularly in a situation that involved an alleged denial of due
process.
(b) Judicial manageability.-The second criterion set forth in
Baker concerns the judicial managability of the issue before the
court."' In this respect, courts apparently do not lack available stan-
dards of review when confronted with a claim of executive privi-
lege.1 52 In fact, courts have an abundance of case law on evidentiary
privileges that can be relied upon by analogy. 5 a Furthermore, courts
are familiar with the balancing competing interests that must be per-
formed when a claim of privilege is asserted.
15
1
In at least one area of the law, which involved considerations
more complex than those raised by an executive privilege, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has held that judicially manageable stan-
dards are available and hence, judicial review is appropriate. This
area of the law is the apportionment of legislative districts. Despite
the difficult problem of working out criteria for equal representation,
course of judicial proceedings, thus denying the litigant his right to a trial in accordance with
established legal procedure. See Comment, Executive Privilege at the State Level, supra note
5 at 639-40.
151. See Lewis, 68 Pa. Commw. at 157, 448 A.2d at 680. In Lewis, the court held that
an Administrative Code provision requiring the Governor to provide legislative leaders with
"budgetary information" was not a nonjusticiable political question. 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 240.
As to the second Baker criterion, the Lewis court said there was "clearly no problem where all
that is sought is information, as distinguished from a compulsion of decision making or pro-
gram action." Id. at 163, 448 A.2d at 684.
152. See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd on other
grounds, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (executive privilege involved justiciable
question "traditionally within the competence of the courts which is to be determined in accor-
dance with the appropriate rules of evidence"); Dorsen and Shattuck, Executive Privilege, The
Congress, The Courts, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 38 (1974); Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congres-
sional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1287, 1355 (1965).
153. Reasoning by way of analogy is a well-established technique in the law of eviden-
tiary privileges. See, e.g., Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d
126 (1981) (executive privilege analogized to privilege for communications between rape vic-
tim and rape crisis center counselor). The possible interchangeability is also suggested by the
fact that the federal district court, in analyzing the claim of an absolute executive privilege in
the Watergate Tapes case, referred to the prior case law concerning the privilege of secrecy
among grand jurors. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 13
(D.D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing Clark v. United States, 239 U.S. 1 (1933)).
154. Comment, Executive Immunity from Judicial Power to Compel Documentary Dis-
closure, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 881, 888 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Executive
Immunity].
the court has held that apportionment issues are justiciable.'55 If
manageable standards are available in apportionment cases, which
often involve complex mathematical tabulating, sufficient standards
should also exist in executive privilege cases. In contrast to the ap-
portionment cases, the claim of a privilege involves far less compli-
cated considerations. The standards for deciding the scope of an ex-
ecutive privilege can be based on distinctions no more difficult to
make than those to which the courts are accustomed in resolving
evidentiary privilege issues.
In sum, an examination of the design and purposes behind the
separation of powers doctrine, as well as an application of the politi-
cal question doctrine, indicate that the executive privilege was not
intended to operate absolutely. Rather, it appears that such a claim
is well within the scope of judicial review.
C. Policy Considerations
Apart from any consideration of the separation of powers doc-
trine, certain policy factors support the recognition of a qualified, as
opposed to an absolute, executive privilege. A critical analysis of the
policy arguments both for and against an absolute executive privilege
reveals that the public interest in resolving a privilege claim in a fair
and expeditious manner is most effectively served when the judge
determines the scope and applicability of the privilege.
Supporters of an absolute executive privilege have argued that
administrative expertise makes executive officials better qualified
than judges to decide whether the public interest demands suppres-
sion of requested documents.1 56 When considering many technical
and scientific points, the ordinary judge may well have difficulty
forming a reasonable opinion about the need for secrecy. 157 This lack
of judicial expertise, however, should not prove to be an insurmount-
able barrier to a judicial determination of the privilege. Judicial na-
ivete can be remedied by appointing masters in appropriate cases. 158
Advocates of the view that the Chief Executive should have fi-
nal discretion regarding the perimeters of the executive privilege
have further contended that the denial of the privilege would invite
political harassment in the form of maliciously inspired, trivial
155. See Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A.2d 556 (1967).
156. See Comment, Executive Immunity, supra note 154 at 888.
157. See Note, Judicial Scrutiny of Documents in the Custody of Governmental De-
partments and Agencies, 36 GEo. L.J. 656, 664 (1948).
158. See Snyker v. Snyker, 245 Minn. 405, 72 N.W.2d 357 (1955) (court-appointed
accountant produced financial transcripts from doctor's records which included privileged com-
munications); Taubeneck and Sexton, Executive Privilege and the Court's Right to Know -
Discovery Against the United States in Civil Actions in Federal District Courts, 48 GEo. L.J.
486, 512 (1960).
charges. 15 9 One should note that this concern is not a new nor unique
problem for the judicial system. Adequate procedures, including dis-
ciplinary action or civil liability for malicious prosecutions, are avail-
able to deter this type of misconduct. Further, the court, prior to
ordering discovery of executive documents, can require a showing of
substantial necessity and good faith.16
As a final argument, proponents of an absolute executive privi-
lege have noted the danger of judicial bias in favor of the private
party.1"' Although judicial bias may exist in rare cases, the problem
is minimized by appellate review and the fact that judges are under
oath to administer justice fairly. 6
Conversely, a great unchecked incentive for a "bureaucratic
bias" results if the final determination is made by the executive
agency. Because of their fairly narrow and one-sided view of issues
coming before the agency, executive officials have a tendency to
overvalue their need for privacy while minimizing the interest of the
individual.1 63 Issues concerning the disclosure of information tend to
be evaluated from one perspective only - the agency's perspective.
Further, the matter of disclosure usually receives little attention
from top-level policy makers; often the agency's determination will
be made routinely by a lower official. The subordinate's decision is
typically approved in a perfunctory fashion by the department head.
In contrast, if the scope and applicability of the privilege were
judicially determined, the judge himself would make the explicit
findings of fact and law. Further, the judge's decision would be
based on arguments presented by both sides and, if necessary, on a
personal inspection of the documents. More important, the judge,
unlike the executive head, does not have a personal interest in the
matter. Thus, he should have a more open mind when deciding the
issue. Although he is a government servant, the judge is not limited
to a consideration of the problems faced by an agency confronting
the possibility that its documents will be publicly disclosed. 64 In-
stead, the judge is equally concerned with the rights of the individual
159. See Garvey, The Amenability of the Governor to Compulsory Process, 7 How. L.J.
120, 131 (1961).
160. See supra notes 103 & 105.
161. "Judicial bias" is said to be the judge's proclivity to focus exclusively on a litigant's
need for obtaining governmental documents to the exclusion of an adequate consideration of
the government's reasons for nonproduction. See Note, The Touhy Case: The Governmental
Privilege to Withhold Documents in Private Litigation, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 519, 529 (1952).
162. See Reynolds, 192 F.2d at 997.
163. See WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2378, 798 n.4; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 110, at 235 (2d ed. 1972).
164. Note, Judicial Scrutiny of Documents in the Custody of Governmental Depart-
ments and Agencies, 36 GEo. L.J. 656, 664 (1948).
and the protection of the public interest.165
V. Scope of the Privilege as it Applies to Lower Executive Officials
The section above indicates that sound public policy and a care-
ful consideration of the separation of powers doctrine support the
concept of a qualified executive privilege. But as Section 111(B) 166
indicates, Pennsylvania case law has adopted an absolute executive
privilege. The term "absolute executive privilege," as previously em-
ployed in this comment, has referred to the degree of finality attach-
ing to an executive determination, i.e., whether the Governor's deci-
sion about nondisclosure of requested information is reviewable by
the courts. The federal and Pennsylvania case law previously dis-
cussed examines the privilege as it operates horizontally across the
three branches of government. The concept of executive privilege can
also be examined and defined vertically. Thus, the question to be
addressed next is, assuming that an absolute privilege exists, how far
down the administrative hierarchy, if at all, can the chief executive
cast his "cloak of immunity" over his subordinates?16
Hartranft partly answered the question concerning the scope of
executive immunity in holding that both the Governor and those offi-
cials carrying out the Governor's orders were exempt from judicial
process.168 Under the Hartranft majority's view of the governor-
subordinate official relationship, the subordinate could not be judi-
cially compelled to disclose any confidential information without the
express permission of the chief executive. The court reasoned that
because the Governor had complete discretionary authority over in-
formation disclosure and because the law contemplated the Gover-
nor's employment of agents in the exercise of that discretion, it natu-
rally followed that the Governor's agents would be entitled to the
same degree of protection granted to the Governor himself.'6 9
Hartranft established that those acting under a specific directive
from the Chief Executive are entitled to the same degree of immu-
nity possessed by the Governor. When acting pursuant to a Gover-
nor's order, the executive official is said to be acting as the Gover-
nor's "alter ego. "170 This vicarious immunity, however, extends only
to actions performed within the subordinate's authority. Thus, when
a lower official acts beyond or in contravention of the Governor's
165. Id.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 49-89.
167. See Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L.
REV. 166, 171 n.22 (1958).
168. Hartranft, 85 Pa. at 444.
169. Id.
170. See Timbers and Cohen, Demands of Litigants for Government Information, 18 U.
Pm'r. L. REV. 687, 701 (1957).
orders, he would be subject to a compulsory court order.17 1
From a constitutional/separation of powers perspective, the
subordinate immunity enunciated in Hartranft appears theoretically
sound. Courts and commentators have recognized that the separation
of powers doctrine applies to every member, superior and
subordinate, of the executive branch. 172 The checks and balances un-
derlying a tripartite system filter down to the lowest levels of
government.
173
Practically speaking, the judiciary has been willing to give more
deference to the decision of a Chief Executive than to one made by a
lower official. The Governor can be easily distinguished from lower
officials because he derives his power directly from the sovereignty of
the people. As the embodiment of an autonomous branch of govern-
ment, the Governor is deemed to be deserving of the highest degree
of respect by the courts. In contrast to the Governor, a lower official
within the executive department is usually not elected by the public
and cannot legitimately claim to be the sole representative of the
executive branch. These distinctions between the Chief Executive
and lower officials explain why most courts have denied executive
immunity from subpoenas to lower officials.' 74
From a public policy viewpoint, the extension of the executive
privilege concept to some subordinates is justifiable. The official in-
formation privilege, by assuring confidentiality to participants in the
executive decision making process, encourages candor and forth-
rightness in top-level discussions. The particular rank or position of
the participant does not govern the applicability of the privilege;
171. On the federal level, the idea of a cabinet officer as the alter ego of the President
appears in several Supreme Court opinions, although in different contexts. See Myers, 272
U.S. at 132; Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 557 (1887). One commentator has ex-
pressed the view that heads of federal departments and agencies do not equally share the
immunity the President possesses. Fallon, Executive Officials and Process of Subpoena to Tes-
tify, 2 VA. L. REv. 270, 273-74 (1914).
172. See Public Assistance Visitors and Records, 35 Pa. D. & C. 89, 91 (1939) (Attor-
ney General opinion that subordinate agencies of the Chief Executive represent a coordinating
branch of the government with the judiciary). See also Comment, Executive Privilege at the
State Level, supra note 5, at 634-35 (courts have no more right to usurp duties of the Gover-
nor than those of the dogcatcher); Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1393
(1974) (no basis for distinguishing presidential papers from other papers in the executive
branch).
173. See Appeal from Glenburn Twp. Audit, 73 Lack. Jurist 101, 107 (Pa. Lackawanna
C.P. 1972).
174. See Opinion of the Justices, 323 Mass. 665, 670-71, 102 N.E.2d 79, 85-86 (1957);
Lowe v. Summers, 67 Mo. App. 637, 655 (1897). See also Commonwealth v. Fisher, 131 Pa.
Super. 117, 121, 198 A. 925, 927 (1938) (subpoena upheld against policeman). Compare
Meaney v. Loew's Motels, Inc., 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 764 (Pike C.P. 1968) (district attorney
entitled to "public interest" privilege in civil action which protected disclosure of information
received in official capacity) with Moss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 373, 132 A.2d 1, 19-20 (1957)
(county prosecutor could not claim privilege against legislative investigation because separa-
tion of powers doctrine does not apply where competing governmental functions are on differ-
ent levels of government).
rather, the nature of the communication and its relation to the pub-
lic interest triggers the protection of the privilege. "' Nonetheless,
this privilege operates mainly at higher levels of the executive branch
where candor and confidentiality are most desired and there is a
need for effective decision making. As a general proposition, the fur-
ther one proceeds down the executive chain of command, the
probability that a subordinate will possess confidential information
worthy of the privilege's protection decreases. 178 The privilege is
largely aimed at communications among top-level policy makers
where disclosure would do the greatest harm to the public interest.
The executive subordinate immunity established in Hartranft
has been the subject of numerous Pennsylvania Attorney General
opinions and cases. In 1923, the Attorney General, citing Hartranft,
stated broadly that the Governor and his executive subordinates
should judge whether the disclosure of subpoenaed communications
would be against public policy.17 7 At the end of the opinion, the At-
torney General significantly qualified this statement and added a ca-
veat intimating that the executive's decision is not totally beyond ju-
dicial review. The Attorney General wrote that the executive branch
should "in the first instance" decide if production of the requested
information would be inimical to the public welfare.7 8 The implicit
message is that courts reserve the power to review the executive's
initial determination.
Apparently overlooking the important caveat in the 1923 Attor-
ney General's opinion, the State Commissioner of Health in Luchka
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 17 9 refused to testify or produce
subpoenaed records an insurance company had requested in order to
establish fraud in a suit against one of its insured. The court held
that the Commissioner could not avoid producing the records on the
grounds that they were privileged and that their publication would
not be in the public interest. According to the Luchka court, Har-
tranft had no application to the case at bar because, "state secrets"
provided the basis of Hartranft.80 In contrast to Hartranft, the
175. See Crawford v. Dominic, 469 F. Supp. 260, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (executive privi-
lege extended to lower level officials based on public interest in effective performance of execu-
tive duties).
176. See Sirica 487 F.2d at 745-46 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (decisions of lower ex-
ecutive departments only entitled to qualified privilege because they "do not have the sweeping
and immediate impact which characterizes the decisions and policies of a President").
177. Production of State Records In Court, 2 Pa. D. & C. 725 (1923). The Attorney
General, in his opinion, relied on judicial inability to enforce its orders and the inconvenience
to the executive department that would result should the Governor and his subordinates be
held amenable to process throughout the state. Id. at 727.
178. Id.
179. Luchka v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 2 Pa. D. & C. 715 (Delaware C.P.
1923).
180. Id. at 716.
court observed that the information sought in Luchka did not affect
the operations of the Commonwealth as a Commonwealth. In re-
jecting the position that the department head was "clothed with au-
thority to say that he will not produce [documents] when required by
a co-ordinate branch . ."181 the court pointed out that the Com-
missioner's insistence in withholding the subpoenaed records would
work a grave miscarriage of justice when such materials were essen-
tial and admissible as evidence. 18
The result in Luchka was essentially overturned by the superior
court's holding in Mark's Appeal.1 83 In facts similar to Luchka, the
head of a municipality's health department was subpoenaed in an
action on an insurance policy to produce medical records of the
claimant but refused to comply with the order. The lower court held
the department head in contempt. On appeal, the superior court re-
versed, holding that, in the absence of a statutory provision, a private
litigant could not require the department to produce for inspection
records and reports relating to communicable diseases. 184 Further,
the court ruled that the question whether the production of such
records was against public policy was to be determined by the de-
partment head.
185
The court in Mark's Appeal based its ruling largely on the as-
sumption that was operative in Hartranft; inspections of the docu-
ments by the judge, in order to determine their privileged character,
were assumed to be always in public. 8 ' Because of this inescapable
fact of public disclosure, which would effectuate the very harm that
was to be guarded against, the determination of whether the docu-
ments should be disclosed was left to the executive official. Reason-
ing from this assumption, the court said that society's interest in
"full and frank disclosure" of public health information, made possi-
181. Id.
182. Id. The court did acknowledge that the Commissioner could refuse to divulge the
contents of an annual report he was required by statute to submit to the Governor. Id.
This position could be seen as an application of the "alter ego" concept observed in the
rationale of Hartranft. As long as the subordinate was acting under the direct auspices of the
Chief Executive, the contents of any communication running from the lower official to the
Governor were privileged. When acting pursuant to the Governor's order, the subordinate steps
into the shoes of the Governor and assumes any immunity afforded the Governor.
If the connection between the Executive's orders and the official's action is more attenu-
ated, the subordinate is left only with his own authority, which will not support a claim of
privilege unto itself.
183. 121 Pa. Super. 181, 183 A. 432 (1936).
184. Id. at 185-86, 189-90, 183 A. at 434-36.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 185-86, 183 A. at 434. In support of this assumption of public disclosure,
Mark's Appeal and Hartranft both cite the English case of Beatson v. Skene, 5 Hurl. & N.
838, 853, 157 Eng. Reprint 1415 (1860), in which Chief Baron Pollock stated that the judicial
inquiry "cannot take place in private, and which taking place in public may do all the mischief
which it is proposed to guard against."
ble because such information was protected from public disclosure
by the courts, outweighed the interests of the individual litigant. 187
The underlying concern in Mark's Appeal for public disclosure
by the judiciary has been rendered obsolete with the advent of in
camera examination. The in camera inspection procedure makes pos-
sible a judicial determination of privilege issues that, in turn, should
result in a fairer weighing of the conflicting interests at stake. 188
Relying on the rationale and holding in Mark's Appeal, the
Pennsylvania Attorney General stated in a 1939 opinion that public
assistance records contained data just as confidential as those in-
volved in Mark's Appeal.189 As such, these records, according to the
Attorney General, could also be withheld from subpoenas at the dis-
cretion of the Department of Public Assistance. 90
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court apparently referred to the
"alter ego" concept for a second time in Harding v. Pinchot.'9' In
addition to dismissing the bill for an injunction against the Gover-
187. Mark's Appeal at 192, 183 A. at 436.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 162-64. Important for the Mark's Appeal court
was undoubtedly the significant public interest at stake - the prevention, control and treat-
ment of communicable diseases. The argument was that absolute confidentiality had to be
assured those who report disease information to encourage voluntary compliance with the
state's reporting requirement. However, once the possibility of public judicial inspection is re-
moved by use of the in camera device, the state's interest is no longer seriously threatened
because the judge is able to ensure that there are no potentially harmful and unnecessary
disclosures.
189. Public Assistance Visitors and Records, 35 Pa. D. & C. 89 (1939). The Attorney
General rendered opinions on two other questions posed by the Department. First, the Attor-
ney General declared that it was lawful for the Secretary of the Department of Public Assis-
tance to delegate to the county boards of assistance the authority to make decisions on the
advisability of submitting or withholding subpoenaed records in particular instances, though
such boards should be governed by general rules promulgated by the Department. Id. at 92.
Second, the Attorney General determined that, while the records of the Department were priv-
ileged, department eligibility investigators could be compelled to testify in civil proceedings
concerning facts of which they have personal knowledge, even though the knowledge was
gained in their official capacity. Id. See also State Department of Health, 27 Pa. Dist. R. 510
(1917) (workmen's compensation referee may not require production of Department of Health
records if the Department regards it improper to produce such records; but the examining
doctor must testify as to relevant facts).
On one hand, this second determination by the Attorney General could be viewed as an
accurate application of the official information privilege. This privilege protects the communi-
cations themselves and not the persons giving and receiving the information. See supra note
175 and accompanying text. The communicants' duties to testify remain unaffected.
On the other hand, the Attorney General's statement seemingly flies in the face of the
command of Hartranfi. If these investigators were considered subordinates of the Governor
they would be exempt from judicial process whenever engaged in official duties. In fact, these
subordinate investigators could not be compelled to disclosure such official information without
the express permission of the Governor. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
The Attorney General, however, apparently did not view the investigators as gubernatorial
subordinates because he analogized them to physicians in charge of state dispensaries who
were "like any other physicians in charge of any other hospital." 35 D. & C. at 90. The
Attorney General regarded the investigators like any other witness who must testify about
relevant competent matter within their knowledge. Id.
190. Public Assistance Visitors and Records, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d at 92.
191. 306 Pa. 139, 159 A. 16 (1932).
nor, the court also declined jurisdiction over the Governor's personal
secretary192 because it was not shown that the secretary's actions in
the case were separate from his performance of duties as the Gover-
nor's personal representative. In the court's view, the secretary
clearly came within the Chief Executive's cloak of immunity. The
court stated, "If the governor is not restrained in a particular case, it
would be illogical to restrain his secretary, who is carrying out his
directions."19 a Although Harding was an action to enforce an injunc-
tion, not a subpoena, the case demonstrates the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's continued acceptance of the "alter ego" concept.
Lower court cases after Harding v. Pinchot began to limit the
reach of the Governor's immunity as it applied to subordinate offi-
cials. For example, the court in Appeal of Labor Lyceum,19 4 while
quashing a motion to subpoena all the papers related to thirty cases
adjudicated by the Liquor Control Board, expressly stated that
"[w]e do not intend to rule that the deliberations of administrative
bodies are sacrosanct or that in a proper case their records are not
subject to subpoenas."' 9 5 While the Labor Lyceum court was not
prepared to grant automatically a privilege to administrative agen-
cies, the court nonetheless was cognizant of the detrimental conse-
quences that would follow if some protection from court process was
not provided the agencies. The court observed that the board mem-
bers were not likely to be subpoenaed to all counties of the state "to
the detriment of the more important duties assigned them by the
legislature."' 96
While the matter of inconvenience 197 and distraction was men-
tioned as a factor in Labor Lyceum, this consideration was rebuffed
by the court in Shetrom v. McCrone.18 In Shetrom, the Department
of Revenue's Administrative Assistant to the Director of Highway
Safety was subpoenaed to appear as a witness in a civil case and to
bring all his notes and transcripts of statements made by the parties
192. The court denied jurisdiction over the state treasurer and the state secretary of
property and supplies because of plaintiff's failure to show any significant expense to the state
in printing the allegedly political forms. Id. at 146, 159 A. at 18.
193. Id.
194. 27 Lehigh L.J. 323, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d I (Lehigh C.P. 1957).
195. Id. at 331, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d at 9. The court said it was merely ruling that the
evidence demanded had no bearing upon the objective of showing that the penalty imposed by
the board was arbitrary, capricious and oppressive. Id. at 329, 331, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d at 8-9.
196. Id. at 331, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d at 9.
197. The possibility of inconvenience to lower officials has not justified the judicial crea-
tion of a blanket exemption in other states. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. Hanna Furnace Corp.,
305 N.Y. 369, 377, 113 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1953) (subpoena upheld against state superinten-
dent of public works); Stratford Factors v. State Banking Dept., 10 App. Div. 2d 66, 70-71,
197 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1960) (subpoena upheld against officials of state banking
department).
198. 72 Dauph. 355, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 97 (Dauphin C.P. 1960).
to the main action. The court, in overruling the assistant's motion to
quash the subpoena, rejected the Department's argument saying it
was grounded on inconvenience in that it would be burdensome for
the Department to respond to subpoenas throughout the state. 199 The
court said the inconvenience argument was a matter of policy to be
left to the legislature.
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Most significant in Shetrom is that the court refused to extend
Hartranft to the facts found in Shetrom. The Shetrom court distin-
guished Hartranft by noting that Hartranft involved the Governor,
the head of a branch, whose official duties were presumed to prevent
him from attending a grand jury proceeding. This presumption of an
executive preoccupation with official duties, the court stated, could
not be extended to an administrative assistant directed to appear as
a witness in a jury trial in a civil case.20'
These Pennsylvania cases and Attorney General opinions are
not wholly inconsistent with the federal law on how far executive
immunity from court process, if it is recognized to exist, extends to
lower officials. The only marked divergence between Pennsylvania
and the federal law is that, in Pennsylvania, the lower official's de-
termination of whether disclosure is detrimental to the public inter-
est conclusively binds the courts.
In United States v. Nixon202 no one claimed that the privilege
allowed the President to prevent the testimony of subordinates. 0 3
Yet the Court in United States v. Reynolds20 4 did, by implication,
recognize that the claim need not be made by the Chief Executive
every time. The Reynolds Court noted, however, that a formal claim
of privilege had to be asserted by the department head having con-
trol over the matter after that head officer personally considered the
matter.206 Lower federal courts have been fairly strict about the for-
199. Id. at 358-59, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d at 100-01.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 358, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d at 101. Although the Shetrom court does not elabo-
rate on this distinction, it appears suspect in at least one respect. Hartranft can indeed be
distinguished from Shetrom since higher, rather than lower officials, were involved in Har-
tranft. Yet the context of Hartranft indicates that the executive immunity was properly ex-
tended to the situation in Shetrom. If immunity will be granted from grand jury subpoenas, as
in Hartranft, when the court's interest in achieving justice and protecting the public is para-
mount, see supra note 93, then there should also be similar immunity in a civil proceeding, as
in Shetrom, where arguably the judiciary's interest in private dispute resolution may not be as
strong.
202. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
203. During the Watergate controversy, however, Attorney General Richard G. Kleindi-
est testified before a Senate Committee that the President had authority to forbid disclosure of
information by any present or former federal employee if the President believed its disclosure
would impair the proper exercise of his constitutional duties. N.Y. Times, April I1, 1973, § I
at I, col. 2.
204. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
205. Id. at 7-8.
mal claim requirements established in Reynolds" 6 and have required
that the claim be made by the senior official clothed with the privi-
lege and not merely by the official's attorney.0 7
Pennsylvania and federal law are in agreement in recognizing
that the power to claim the privilege, like any other executive power,
may be delegated to other officials. Under federal law, authority to
claim the privilege may be delegated only to agency heads.2 08 Under
Hartranft and the Pennsylvania view, the reach of the executive
privilege is largely defined by the alter ego concept; if the lower offi-
cial is acting pursuant to the Governor's orders, he is entitled to
claim the executive privilege even though he may not be a depart-
ment head. Thus, in terms of the scope of the privilege, federal and
Pennsylvania law differ to the extent that subordinates, acting under
a chief executive's order, comprise a larger or smaller group of offi-
cials than that which would be limited to agency, department, and
cabinet heads.
VI. Conclusion
Although Hartranft has the force of stare decisis behind it, trial
and appellate decisions indicate that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court will adopt some form of the qualified executive privilege rec-
ognized in United States v. Nixon 09 if it squarely faces the issue.
This observation is justified for several reasons. First, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has adopted the balancing approach of
United States v. Nixon when confronted with evidentiary privilege
questions in other areas. 10 Second, the court has demonstrated an
increased willingness to require a witness to testify in order to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of the accused, even if such forced testi-
mony derogated a statutory privilege and conflicted with the state's
interest underlying the privilege. " ' Third, given the state judiciary's
206. See Center for Corporate Responsibility v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 872-73 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (mere statement by special counsel to the President that he was authorized to claim
the privilege held insufficient to activate formal claim of privilege).
207. Crawford v. Dominic, 469 F. Supp. 260, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
208. But see H. REP. No. 2497, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1956) (the executive privilege
belongs only to the President himself).
209. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
210. See Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126 (1981);
Lepley v. Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas, 481 Pa. 565, 393 A.2d 306 (1978).
211. E.g., Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 482 Pa. 538, 394 A.2d 453 (1978). In this case,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). The Davis Court held that the sixth amendment right
of confrontation required that a defendant in a state criminal case be allowed to impeach the
credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination directed at possible bias deriving
from the witness' probationary status as a juvenile delinquent. This right of confrontation was
guaranteed even though it conflicted with a state statute and the state's legitimate interest in
preserving the confidentiality of juvenile delinquency proceedings. Slaughter is significant in a
discussion of the executive privilege because if the court in the protection of a defendant's
desire to construe constitutional rights harmoniously with the federal
212interpretation, one could well expect the state high court to bring
Pennsylvania in line with the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ings in this area.
As noted at the outset of this comment, the doctrine of execu-
tive privilege is fraught with tensions. These tensions, however, are
not necessarily undesirable. It is through varying modes of conflict
and cooperation that individual rights are protected. The tug of war
between the three branches of government guards against tyranny
and oppression.
Pennsylvania in the past has reconciled these tensions by a total
judicial abdication to the will of the executive. This judicial abdica-
tion results in a muting of the underlying tensions. A more appropri-
ate approach would be to expose those tensions in recognition of the
valuable role they play in a democracy. The tensions underlying the
executive privilege can work for the benefit of all. The first step in
the right direction is to recognize a greater role for judicial scrutiny
of executive privilege claims.
John Michael Abel
right to confrontation is willing to pierce a statutory provision it should also be willing to
protect that right in face of an armorphous executive privilege that is not statutorily based.
212. See Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 452 Pa. 185, 229 A.2d 254 (1973) (state's concep-
tion of 'waiver' under the Post Conviction Hearing Act should be aligned with that used in
federal courts).

